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Abstract 
Time to go beyond interstate federalism – or something different? 
The response of new pro-European think tanks to the EU integration crisis 
The European financial and economic crisis has shaken traditional beliefs and confidence 
in a one-directional move towards an ever closer union. Discussions regarding “Grexit” 
and the public vote in favor of “Brexit” have signaled strong anti-EU sentiment far beyond 
previous instances of dissatisfaction expressed by popular votes in France and the 
Netherlands opposing the European constitution, for example. Mainstream European 
integration scholars have started to seriously address disintegration theory; once a 
preserve of Marxist critiques of mainstream integration scholarship. European right-wing 
parties, foundations and think tanks openly advocate (partial) disintegration and, in 
particular, aim to interrupt centrist Social Democratic, Green, Liberal and Conservative 
cooperation in the European Parliament. What has been the response to these conceptual 
and political challenges from the pro-European political forces in European politics? In the 
shadow of Syriza’s anti-austerity campaign from Greece and Podemos’ grassroots 
mobilization in Spain, a range of new pro-European think tanks of different political-
philosophical leanings have been founded after the crisis, or developed new activities in 
response to the crisis. The paper will examine the publications of organizations like 
European Alternatives, Project for a Democratic Europe and EuropaNova in order to 
observe if and how a new cross-cutting network of pro-European intellectuals, think tanks 
and ideas address the present crisis, and if and in which ways we can speak of new 
conceptual and political approaches to European integration that promise innovation and 
progressive (in the sense of pro-European integration) learning. Do they look beyond 
neoliberal restrictions to Europe’s “sui generis” Union (Hayek’s version of interstate 
federalism), something closer to real (fiscal) federalism - or something different? We will 
also examine if and how they differ from more centrist institutional efforts to envision 
the future, such as those uttered by Commission officials, MEPs of the Spinelli-Group, or 
experts like those assembled in the Glienicker Group. Last, but not least, we will try to 
establish if and to what extent new conceptual efforts reverberate in pro-European 
integration debating platforms like Publixphere, OneEurope or Krytyka Polityczna 
(Political Critique), which are considered more likely echo chambers for pro-European 
integration think tanks than mainstream media. 
 
 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Ist es Zeit, über zwischenstaatlichen Föderalismus hinauszugehen – 
oder für etwas ganz anderes? 
Die Antwort neuer pro-europäischer Think-Tanks auf die europäische 
Integrationskrise 
Die europäische Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise hat traditionelle Vorstellungen bezüglich 
der europäischen Integration und das Vertrauen in die Entwicklung in Richtung einer 
immer engeren Union erschüttert. Diskussionen über den „Grexit“ und das Votum für den 
„Brexit“ haben starke anti-europäische Stimmungen erkennen lassen, die weit über bishe-
rige Unzufriedenheit, wie sie z.B. bei Volksabstimmungen in Frankreich und den Nieder-
landen gegen die europäische Verfassung zum Ausdruck kamen, hinausreichen. Der 
Mainstream Europäischer Integrationsforschung hat ernsthaft damit begonnen, Auflö-
sungstheorien zu thematisieren, einst eine Domäne marxistischer Kritik an der etablierten 
Integrationsforschung. Rechtsgerichtete europäische Parteien, Stiftungen und Think-
Tanks befürworten offen einen teilweisen Rückbau und beabsichtigen insbesondere, die 
Zusammenarbeit von gemäßigten Sozialdemokraten, Grünen, Liberalen und Konservativen 
im Europäischen Parlament zu beenden. Welche Antworten geben pro-europäische politi-
sche Kräfte in der europäischen Politik auf diese konzeptionellen und politischen Heraus-
forderungen? Im Schatten der Syriza-Kampagne gegen die Sparpolitik in Griechenland und 
der Mobilisierung durch Podemos in Spanien wurden nach der Krise eine Reihe pro-euro-
päischer Think-Tanks verschiedener politisch-ideologischer Ausrichtung gegründet oder 
haben neue Aktivitäten als Reaktion auf die Krise entwickelt. Der Beitrag untersucht die 
Publikationen von Organisationen wie European Alternatives, Project for a Democratic 
Europe und EuropaNova um festzustellen, ob und wie ein neues, übergreifendes Netzwerk 
pro-europäischer Intellektueller, Think-Tanks und Ideen die gegenwärtige Krise themati-
siert. Dabei wird insbesondere gefragt, ob und in welcher Weise von neuen konzeptionel-
len und politischen Ansätzen zur europäischen Integration gesprochen werden kann, die 
Innovation und fortschrittliches Lernen (im Sinne von pro-europäischer Integration) ver-
sprechen. Gehen Beiträge über die neoliberalen Restriktionen der Europäischen „sui 
generis“ Union hinaus (Hayeks Variante eines zwischenstaatlichen Föderalismus), etwa in 
Annäherung an europäischen (fiskalischen) Föderalismus - oder etwas anderes? Zur 
Einordnung der Beiträge der Think-Tanks werden diese mit Aussagen zur Zukunft der EU 
aus Studien im Kontext der europäischen Institutionen abgeglichen, darunter Beiträge von 
Kommissionsbeamten, Abgeordneten der Spinelli-Gruppe zur Arbeit des Europäischen 
Parlamentes sowie Fachleuten und Beratern z.B. der Glienicker Gruppe. Last but not least 
wird versucht zu ermitteln, ob und inwieweit sich die konzeptionelle Arbeit der Think-
Tanks in pro-europäischen Diskussionsplattformen wie Publixphere, OneEurope oder 
Krytyka Polityczna (Political Critique) niederschlägt oder spiegelt. Diese kommen stärker 
als etwa nationale Printmedien als mögliche Echokammern der pro-europäischen Think-
Tanks in Frage, weil Autorinnen und Autoren sowie Leser und Leserinnen als generell 
europainteressiert gelten können.  
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1 Introduction: Does the struggle over the future of European 
integration generate new concepts? 
Europe’s financial and economic crisis followed the subprime market collapse in 
the United States. It will certainly be remembered as a – if not the – critical 
moment in the history of European integration. While there have been severe 
crises of European integration before, and scholars have come to regard crises as a 
normal (constitutive) element of European integration dynamics (Deppe and Felder 
1993), it was, and remains, unclear if the subsequent events of 2008 will go down 
in history as seeds of reversal, setting off dynamics of disintegration. To mitigate 
this, the sovereign debt and euro crisis have been contained by way of creating 
new financial institutions like the European Stability Mechanism, and also by 
reforming the governing institutions of the European Economic and Monetary 
Union. Europe’s new economic governance regime relies more heavily on ex-ante 
coordination (European Semester) and has introduced stronger compliance 
mechanisms. The Maastricht criteria stipulating a yearly deficit below 3 per cent, a 
debt to GDP ratio of less than 60 per cent, and a low inflation rate, have been 
fortified. At the same time, the new economic governance regime returned to 
inter-governmental decision making and control, rather than strengthening the 
supranational community mode of governance (Puetter 2012); this raises new 
doubts with regard to the prospect of Europe’s post-national democracy. In socio-
economic terms, post-Maastricht Europe has been stabilized at the expense of 
severe, permanent and “constitutionalized austerity” (McBride 2016), raising 
inequality both between and within EU member states and, as a result, increasing 
social instability and tensions. Indeed, in the face of mounting social insecurity 
and growing dissatisfaction with Europe’s economic and social order, and in light 
of the Brexit vote, it is unclear if crisis containment amounts to a Pyrrhus victory. 
A surge in right-wing Euroscepticism, and, to a much lesser extent, left-wing 
EU critiques in terms of the popular vote in European and national elections1, has 
swept governments to power that advocate less, rather than more, European 
integration in EU member states; traditional nationalist opposition to the EU has 
been reinvigorated, such as in the UK, Poland and Hungary (Plehwe and Schlögl 
2014). Other critics continue to support European integration, but object to the 
principle goal of an ever closer union. Right-wing anti-European and Eurosceptic 
parties have also gained a lot of support in countries where they are still a 
minority, no matter whether inside or outside government coalitions (Finland, 
                                                 
1  The 2.35 per cent increase of the European left in the EP from 2009 to 2014 is almost exclusively 
due to the strong results of Syriza in Greece. On the other side of the aisle in the EP, the 
membership in the Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists faction has increased by 
1.92 per cent with new members from different countries (including Germany’s AFD); the newly 
formed European political party and EP group of Freedom and Direct Democracy (Le Pen etc.) 
gained 2.35 per cent, and the mostly right-wing non-aligned parties gained another 2.61 per cent. 
The total gain on the right of center parties thus amounts to about 7 per cent, compared with the 
2 per cent gain on the radical left. Retrieved on 28th October: www.europarl.europa.eu/elections 
2014-results/en/election-results-2014.html. 
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Sweden, Denmark, Austria, the Netherlands, Germany and France to name just a 
few). Even the scholarly debate has started to seriously discuss disintegration in 
light of strong centrifugal forces and open calls for exit in many member states 
(Vollaard 2014, Eppler and Scheller 2013).  
The “Brexit” vote in the UK referendum of June 23, 2016 underlines the new 
sense of urgency with 52 per cent of the votes cast demanding to leave the EU. 
Even though slightly fewer than 50 per cent voted remain, it is hard to overlook 
the deep social divide on the question of Europe. What seemed like a distant 
conservative fantasy for a considerable amount of time has suddenly become real, 
with deeper European integration no longer taken for granted.  
In the face of the crisis, a positive agenda for reversal of European integration 
or “partial disintegration” has been developed by the Alliance of Conservatives 
and Reformists (and the New Direction Foundation, compare Plehwe and Schlögl 
2014). Under leadership of the Tories and their “Open Europe” think tank (in 
London, Brussels and Berlin2), this agenda has been difficult to reconcile with a 
‘pro-European’ vote championed by David Cameron. Brexit, of course, will lead to 
another version of partial disintegration since the British government will try to 
preserve many benefits of European integration in seeking a status similar to 
Norway or Switzerland. But no matter which way withdrawing countries and the 
remaining EU members choose, European integration will no longer be considered 
a one-way street. Metaphors of different speeds of integration and “Europe á la 
carte” of the 1990s expressed a need for greater flexibility, but still assumed 
universal progress towards an eventual deeper union. It is quite likely, if not 
certain, that the new discussion will be somewhat different. At the conceptual 
level crisis and social struggles at least have opened the venue for counter-
proposals to the previously hegemonic narrative. 
Under threat of (partial) disintegration it is all the more important to also 
observe and scrutinize more closely the other side(s) of the European integration 
debate. What do the pro-European forces discuss and propose as future options for 
Europe in the face of the neo-nationalist counter proposals? In which ways does 
the pro-European (center-)left respond to the threat of (partial) disintegration? 
Right-wing populism clearly is on the horizon not only for the European 
Commission and the technocratic pro-European officials; it is also increasingly 
regarded as a political challenge for the (center-)left spectrum of policy makers 
and activists. Pro-European foundations like the Friedrich Ebert Foundation or 
Bertelsmann Foundation in Germany have launched major surveys asking what 
European citizens think and want3; Soros foundation has already created a major 
funding line in 2011 on “reluctant radicals”4 to account for the popularity of right-
                                                 
2  The German office enjoys strong support of prominent German ordo-liberal forces such as Otmar 
Issing and Michael Wohlgemuth. Wohlgemuth serves as Director. German neoliberals have long 
supported „Open Europe“ think tank perspectives as a cachet of de facto anti-European thinking 
(unless Europe is opening to the global market) now bundled under the title of this version of 
“European” think tank. 
3  http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/12346.pdf, (retrieved on 28th October 2016); https://www. 
bertelsmann-stiftung.de (retrieved on 28th October 2016) “what-do-the-people-want”. 
4  http://counterpoint.uk.com/ideaslab/reluctant-radicals-2/ (retrieved on 28th October 2016). 
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wing populism and to advance strategies needed to contain, if not re-integrate, 
supporters of the new right.  
The growing reservations toward European integration by European citizens 
in many countries will undoubtedly require considerable efforts to counteract; 
pro-European rhetoric alone will not address current economic, social and cultural 
anxieties. Thus, a reinvigorated pro-European camp must seemingly confront a 
two-fold challenge: meet the growing discontent toward European integration on 
the one hand, while addressing the neoliberal economic integration bias of the EU 
mainstream in support of permanent austerity and intensified globalization on 
the other. Although the neo-nationalist challenge by the political right is 
considerable (partly due to the promise of social integration on nationalist, if not 
racist terms) the EU is also facing increasing hostility on the left due to the crisis 
of globalized capitalism and mounting social insecurity. Many on the left doubt 
that the EU can be reformed in a progressive manner, and, consequently, argue for 
European disintegration as well. Of course, in contrast to the right, the demand 
includes a call for a re-launch in favor of democratic politics and transnational 
solidarity (Wehr 2004/2016). In line with cold-war stereotypes regarding 
similarities of the left and the right, however, (radical) right and left-wing 
populism is frequently lumped together and evoked as equal dangers for the EU5. 
To this end, the free market right has developed a survey tool (authoritarian 
populism index)6. This presents the discussion over the future of Europe with 
some difficulty: Does the mainstream need to look at the left to find new 
inspiration for a future dictated less by the demands of corporate globalization 
and the influence of neoliberal ideology? Or should the mainstream avoid the 
(radical) left as much as the radical right in order to preserve an increasingly 
neoliberal European Union? Even progressive thinkers are in a quandary over 
ambiguous center-left positions with regard to the future of Europe, between 
moderate social reform and radical critique of neoliberalism.  
In this research we will attempt to turn this most general concern into an 
empirical question: What do pro-European think tanks often created by young 
people discuss and propose for an alternative European future? Can we identify 
conceptual innovations and in which policy areas? Do they consider a new type of 
polity (e.g. European fiscal Federalism, or something else)? Can we speak about a 
new pro-European center-left in terms of think tanks? In which ways do their 
contributions differ from reflections we find in, or close to, the mainstream 
circles of policy making in Europe? Rather than examining the (in-)compatibility 
of left-wing or progressive proposals, it is considered more crucial to explore the 
impulses from the new pro-European think tanks in order to assess whether the 
                                                 
5  A common argument of the collapse of Weimar referred to the opposition against the Weimar 
Republic from the right-wing parties and Communists. The stereotype cannot account for the fact 
that the Weimar Republic was indeed destroyed by the radical right and not by the Communists, 
but cold war requirements of anti-communist alliances benefited greatly from the convenient 
myth of the left = right equation.  
6  http://counterpoint.uk.com/ideaslab/reluctant-radicals-2/ (retrieved on 28th October 2016); 
http://www.epicenternetwork.eu/briefings/the-authoritarian-populism-index-main-findings/ 
(retrieved on 28th October 2016). 
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slate of pro-European forces has developed a new counter proposal to (partial) 
disintegration perspectives. 
Based on expert interviews7 we have chosen a number of pro-European think 
tanks that have been founded around the time of the global financial crisis in 
order to see if, and, in which ways, a new wing of pro-European thought has 
emerged in general, and at the left, in particular. Rather than looking at the 
established European left of political parties and foundations (like Rosa-
Luxemburg Foundation or the European transform network), this research will 
focus on civil society contributions that do not profess to a specific political party 
and major left-wing ideology (of socialist, communist or green orientations, for 
example). Since the new progressive movements of Syriza and Podemos were the 
only left-wing parties that managed to gain considerable support after the 2008 
financial crisis, we are looking for clues about new (civil society) influences in the 
theoretical and discursive field. 
Think tanks are interesting in this regard, since they are situated at the 
interface of the academic and philosophical field, the political field, the economic 
field and the media field (Medvetz 2012). Think tanks have been attributed the 
particular role and strength to develop important philosophical-political 
narratives that can become quite influential in the political discourse, namely, 
story lines that explain important aspects of the political and social reality in 
simplified ways (Hajer 1993, Saloma III 1984). This turns think tanks into para-
political forces that have come to play an increasing role in contemporary “post-
democratic” circumstances (Mair 2013). The decline of political parties, 
fragmentation of the public sphere, internationalization of political negotiations, 
decision making, and cross-border challenges are all difficult to manage in 
traditionally nation-state centered political systems (compare Plehwe 2015 on the 
role think tanks and policy networks have on modern neoliberal age governance 
patterns).  
However, a sprawling pro-European movement across the member states is 
evident. In particular, many young people – “generation Erasmus” or the “EasyJet 
generation” – are now accustomed to the European reality of multiculturalism and 
open borders. Many within this highly mobile generation dislike political 
positions that attempt to roll back the achievements of the EU in terms of 
transnational civil rights, freedom and mobility. Although the new pro-European 
think tanks share many common values along these lines, they are certainly not a 
homogeneous entity; particularly, as they have been founded in different 
countries by different groups of people, while funded by various sources. Their 
activists and intellectuals are motivated by a range of different concerns, united 
only with regard to a clear pro-European integration perspective. Hence, we also 
expect a certain range of future thinking in the realm of their research and 
articulation. Both the spectrum of perspectives and the stage of development of 
new pro-European think tanks can be considered a strength and weakness at the 
                                                 
7  Thanks to Victoria Kupsch for participating in the opening workshop of the research project, and 
offering considerable advice on possible candidates. 
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same time: If pro-European think tanks are not united in their concerns, it is 
difficult to push or pull together in a similar direction. But if the spectrum of 
reflections is interesting and attractive, it may also generate a new discourse and 
debate that could militate against the (partial) disintegration narratives. Likewise, 
if a range of more radical ideas with regard to European integration are difficult 
to translate into concrete reform projects that reach and resonate with a broad 
audience, they might be considered simply irrelevant. On the other hand, the 
window of opportunity for concrete reforms can be short and narrow; strong 
concerns with practicality may hamper a more radical and demanding reform 
agenda that would arguably be necessary to overcome common concerns with the 
present stage of mostly neoliberal Europe. The choice may be somewhere between 
filtering new ideas that have a chance to be realized and generate an experience of 
successful reform, to more challenging ideas that may need dedication and 
patience in the longer run, while also providing a compass needed to develop a 
far-ranging European alternative. We will try to observe the range of perspectives, 
and find out if conceptual ideas circulate in pro-European debates generated by 
another slate of pro-European organizations, namely online platforms and online 
magazines. 
First, we will introduce the organizations that we have examined in close 
detail, namely, five European think tanks and five debating platforms and their 
considerable output (of approximately 3000 documents) available on their 
websites (section 1). Each think tank will then be characterized in terms of this 
output. To this end, we have compiled and sorted the documents in a dedicated 
database on the basis of attributed keywords in the different spheres of political, 
economic, social etc. thought (section 2). On the backdrop of the descriptive 
statistical examination of the work of the think tanks, we have deepened the 
analysis of approximately 50 select (typically somewhat longer) documents 
produced by the think tanks, which qualified with regard to conceptual work. We 
present an examination of pro-European conceptual innovation in the following 
five areas: 1) European citizenship; 2) European democracy; 3) European public 
interest economy/economic democracy; 4) European civil society and public 
sphere; and 5) European foreign policy. In each of these areas we will look at, 
arguably, innovative elements of new or reconceptualizations of the EU on the one 
hand, and on the extent to which they are developed into concrete programs on 
the other hand. In each case we will use European mainstream (or near 
mainstream) reflections, such as the Five Presidents’ Report, the Spinelli Report, 
and the Glienicker Gruppe work etc. to check if and to what extent the new Europe 
think tanks overlap with their reflections on the future of European integration 
(section 3). Last, but not least, we will look at the work of the second group of new 
pro-European debating organizations to see if and how the conceptual work of the 
new Europe think tanks is reflected in the (pro-)European online debates. Since 
such organizations are close to the pro-European think tank landscape examined 
here, we expect to find considerable attention to the conceptual work advanced by 
these think tanks, before they would possibly be taken up in the media and public 
at large (section 4). Our conclusions will address the general questions raised in 
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the beginning of this introduction, again, pointing to strength and weaknesses of 
the new Europe discourse emanating from these sources. We will also suggest 
ways to look and move forward the future of Europe think tank analysis in 
general and with regard to progressive Europe discourses in particular. 
1.1 A brief word on methodology 
We apply think tank analysis as laid out in the work of Medvetz (2012). According 
to this perspective, think tanks occupy a distinct space between and related to the 
political, academic, media and economic spheres. According to our think tank 
network analysis approach, we examine networks of intellectuals, organizations 
and ideas (Plehwe 2015). Individuals linked to think tanks (as staff or board 
members) are examined by way of situated group biographical research (compare 
Mirowski and Plehwe 2009/2016). The focus in this project is on the network of 
(conceptual) ideas, which we have established on the basis of a close reading of all 
documents published on the websites of the think tanks8 under examination. 
(Key-) concepts like (European) citizenship or (transnational) democracy are time 
and context bound semantic expressions, shaped by social struggles and subject to 
change over time (Koselleck 2002, compare Olsen 2012 for an introduction to 
conceptual history). Since the 2008 global financial crisis gave rise to considerable 
struggles around the European integration project, we can expect conceptual 
change and innovation with regard to political meaning and normative 
orientation. The rise of counter concepts like (partial) disintegration against 
prevailing understandings of an ever closer union trigger discursive and political 
struggles that take place in a new constellation of pro- and anti-European 
integration forces. (Political) Concepts overlap with ideology (normativity) since 
ideology is composed of (ordered, prioritized) political concepts (Freeden 1996). 
The conceptual position and innovation we attempt to observe is considered an 
indispensable dimension of the current struggles over the future of European 
societies and, possibly, society, over European class, civil society and state 
formation processes within and across borders. We attempt to identify the 
emerging semantic space characterized by contested European integration 
concepts. Contestation can be captured by specifying different understandings of 
contested concepts like citizenship (e.g. in the shape of re-nationalized or 
expanded European forms), and situate them on the wider map of pro- and anti-
European integration perspectives. In this way, we also innovatively visualize the 
European conceptual debate as far as the findings from this empirical research are 
concerned. 
While our sample of think tanks (and debating platforms) has been assembled 
on the basis of expert advice and is certainly too small to be representative of the 
                                                 
8  Quoted documents published by the organizations under review are not included in the list of 
literature. Content published by think tanks is listed in annex 5.1 (table 24-28), for each 
conceptual dimension respectively. Articles on expanded European citizenship by debating 
platforms are included in table 20, chapter 3.1. As the other conceptual dimensions are covered 
more extensively by the debating platforms, they are listed in annex 5.1. as well (table 29-30).   
 
  7 
new pro-European think tank and intellectual field at large, we are confident that 
we look at a significant and broad enough segment of this field stretching from 
more centrist (like French EuropaNova in the Gaullist tradition) to more radical 
left (like European Alternatives) perspectives. While the inevitable selection bias 
limits the conclusions we can draw, the data from the organizations selected is 
comprehensive. We have scraped all publications ranging from published papers 
to blog entries of the five think tanks and loaded them in a relational database 
which stores online accessible publications. Besides the text itself, we stored 
several information/entities on the text as well. These entities are: 
1. Institutions (as think tanks or blog and journal sites under editorial control) 
2. Individuals (as authors or leading personnel of institutions) 
3. Date of publication 
4. Link to the publication 
The text of the publications was extracted and saved in the database for further 
analysis. Thus, we searched for n-grams9 and catchwords by frequency and 
assigned descriptors. The classification of publications by concepts rests partially 
upon the assignment of descriptors and n-grams. We attributed key words to each 
document, and concepts if appropriate (if we identified progressive pro-European 
ideas that would take the EU beyond the present configuration). Our detailed 
survey and deep examination of publications is backed up with interviews of four 
officials from three organizations (European Alternatives, PDU, OneEurope), which 
has helped us to consolidate and reconsider our examination of the publications.10 
In a similar way, we dealt with the online platforms: Of 2,133 documents scraped 
from the sites of five blog or journal sites (which are) concerned with EU affairs 
we identified 111 (5.2 per cent) as associated with the conceptual work discovered 
at the pro-European think tank sites. We will discuss our method employed in this 
case in greater detail in section 3. Complementary efforts to automatically 
identify and sort documents with regard to the semantic code of the five new 
Europe conceptual ideas based on n-grams (frequency of co-occurrence of key 
terms) failed, by and large. At this point it is still difficult to distinguish the 
occurrence of words in general from the occurrence of words in regard to specific 
conceptual discussion, unfortunately. Much of the work presented in this paper is 
based on the close reading of the full output of think tanks and platforms (around 
3,000 documents). 
1.2 Pro-European think tanks 
Since the crisis gave birth to a new partial disintegration perspective on the right 
in addition to full-fledged re-nationalization strategies, the pro-European camp 
also needed to develop a response to these challenges, and possibly establish its 
                                                 
9  A certain (not necessarily contiguous) sequence of two or more meaningful words, the frequency 
of which occurrences exceeds a chosen threshold. 
10  References to the interviews mentioned in the text can be found in the list of interview (see 5.4.) 
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own sense of “new directions”. The most obvious need and activity rose in the 
crisis countries of the South: Both Syriza and Podemos were the only significant 
forces of the left that gained in or even won elections in Spain and Greece, 
respectively. But what happened in civil society? A number of new pro-European 
think tanks have been founded after the crisis, and some of them developed into 
permanent organizations. We also included two somewhat older pro-European 
think tanks, Friends of Europe and EuropaNova, due to significant new activities 
following the 2008 crisis. The following table displays the list of organizations 
selected for this study. 
Table 1: Pro-European think tanks, locations, founding dates 
Name Orientation Country/countries Year 
European Alternatives radical left UK, Germany, France, Italy etc. 2006/7 
Project for a 
Democratic Union 
liberal left UK, Germany, Belgium, Greece, 
Romania, Czech Republic, 
Portugal 
2013 
Todiktio moderate left Greece 2013 
EuropaNova centrist France 2003 
Friends of Europe plural/centrist Belgium and across Europe 1999 
European Alternatives radical left UK, Germany, France, Italy etc. 2006/7 
Source: Own compilation 
Another group of think tanks originally included in the sample has been excluded 
for different reasons. European Democracy Lab founded in Germany in 2014, 
European Way founded in Italy/Germany in 2016 and Eurobubble, founded in 
Berlin, Germany, in 2016 are too new to offer a broad range of documents. Major 
conceptual work has been published by the co-author of this report, Ulrike Guérot. 
The call for a new European Republic (Guérot 2016) also informs the work of 
European Way and Eurobubble. Rather than including the European Republic in 
our analysis, we can use this perspective as a vantage point for the discussion of 
the work of the five pro-European think tanks of the sample. We will now proceed 
to introduce the think tanks under investigation in somewhat greater detail.  
a) European Alternatives (or Euralter) 
Founded in 2006 by a group of people coming from different countries European 
Alternatives carried out first activities in the UK. The London festival of Europe 
was organized in March 2007 to commemorate the 50th anniversary of treaty of 
Rome. European Alternatives (EA) strives for culture, equality and democracy in 
Europe beyond the nation state. Motivated by the fading ambition for the 
European project and an apparently unchangeable agenda of European policies, EA 
wanted to offer a progressive alternative to existing European structures and, 
above all, approach the European project through culture and new, unconventional 
and nonconformist debating spaces. EA is a network of progressive artists, 
thinkers, scientists and activists across Europe who wanted a paradigm shift 
regarding what Europe is – a space beyond the nation state – and started off 
through artist activism, prior to becoming more institutionalized, as well as 
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involvement in EU programming and running workshops (e.g. on the refugees 
crisis and other matters). EA´s central theme is the notion of a European 
citizenship, influenced first by the the Czech philosopher Jan Patocka (Europe after 
Europe) and later by the philosophies of Jacques Derrida or Etienne Balibar, for 
example. EA is a well-known institution, especially in younger, leftist circles 
across Europe, which is also supported by EU funding, well connected to new party 
movements such as Syriza or Podemos and with a visible and strong reach in 
activists circles (e.g. refugee activists, social movements and the like). EA has 
offices in London, Paris, Berlin and Rome. About fifty per cent of the funding is 
project-based and comes from a variety of sources (EU, national, e.g. German 
federal agency for civic education, participation in Horizon 2020 research projects, 
Italian sources foundations11). 
b) Project for a Democratic Union 
Founded in 2014, PDU is a European initiative focused on ideas from British 
historian Brendan Simms. Author of several books on European history, Simms 
eagerly promotes a unified and political Europe, but without the UK. To give his 
ideas a political underpinning in the real world, Simms launched PDU together 
with some of his students (e.g. Benjamin Zeeb, Munich), who, in various cities (e.g. 
Munich, Amsterdam, Cambridge, London, Vienna, home to a core team of six 
individuals), have non-institutionalized one-person “offices”, serving as pieds-à-
terre to PDU. PDU further gathered some quite prominent European VIPS (such as 
Javier Solana, Antony Giddens, Gesine Schwan) to its Board and has since 
attempted to work as a network structure to organize or co-organize European 
debates in several European towns, as well as publish policy papers. Funding of 
PDU is limited to partnerships for specific events and small donations. PDU does 
not have resources to fund permanent staff. The aim of the organization is 
threefold: Influence academic and elite discourse; develop a broader public 
discourse on what is regarded as the present dysfunctional European system; and, 
identify and move towards a new and viable framework for European integration. 
PDU does not emphasize conceptual innovation, but relies mainly on Anglo-Saxon 
precedence of union building, in other words, a common foreign policy and 
common debt.  
c) Todiktio 
Todiktio is a European project with a focus on social policy founded in 2012 in 
Athens by Anna Diamantopulous, the former EU Commissioner for Social Affairs in 
the second Commission of Jacques Delors 1990-1995. Anna believed that the 
ardent social crisis in Greece during the peak of the euro-crisis years starting in 
2008 needed a project to reconcile Greece youngsters with the European project. 
As an influential former politician in Greece (Socialist Party, Minister of Education 
etc.), she also held herself personally responsible and felt compelled to make a 
                                                 
11  Compare EA accounts: https://euroalter.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/EuropeanAlternatives 
accountsfor2015approvedbymembers.docx.pdf (retrieved on 28th October 2016), and a list of 
funders at www.euroalter.com/who-we-are/our-organisation/our-funders (retrieved on 28th 
October 2016).  
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contribution to alleviating tensions in Greece during the crisis and support a 
transition out of it. Todiktio organized youth meetings in Greece, attempted to 
raise funds for victims of the euro crisis and to mobilize public opinion for a more 
social Europe. The think tank lists partnerships with Friends of Europe, Friedrich-
Ebert-Foundation, Citizens for Europe and Notre Europe. It has a strong 
international board with members from various European countries, among them 
several ranking politicians.  
d) EuropaNova 
EuropaNova was founded in 2003 by Guillaume Klossa in Paris in order to revamp 
the European discussion in France. Mainly supported by young activists, 
EuropaNova has a highly political agenda and is close to the former UMP party 
(now: Les Républicains). In contrast to Euralter (more radical left), Todiktio (more 
moderate left) or PDU (liberal), EuropaNova (like Friends of Europe) can be 
considered more centrist. Guillaume Klossa has been invited multiple times to the 
Elysée during Sarkozy’s presidency, was invited to draft policy papers and to give 
recommendations, especially on Eurozone governance. Most recently, EuropaNova 
launched a manifesto after Brexit, gathering hundreds of signatures by European 
VIPs. To a certain degree, EuropaNova is less ‘new’ in attitude or concepts with 
respect to concrete new thinking on Europe – such as EA – hence, it is arguably 
the youngest and most dynamic think tank in France in the field of European 
policy, in comparison to more established organizations such as the Institut 
Français des Relations Internationales (ifri), the Institut de Recherche 
Internationale Stratégique (IRIS), the Institute for Research and Innovation in 
Society (Ifris), the Center for International Studies (CERI), Notre Europe or the 
Fondation pour la Politique (Fondapol). Ifri, IRIS and CERI are the classical decades-
old French research Centre’s on European integration issues, with a strong focus 
on the external or foreign relations agenda of the EU and its geo-strategic impact. 
CERI, a research center attached to the famous Institut d’Etudes Politiques des 
Paris, strongly focused on “old paradigms” of European integration research – e.g. 
neo-functional method etc. - through quite prominent French academics, Renaud 
Dehousse and Christian Lequesnes. Notre Europe, founded by former European 
Commission President Jacques Delors in 1996, has a twenty-year-old history and 
has been doing comprehensive European analysis and studies related to nearly all 
policy fields of the EU, but with a strong focus on social policies. Despite a 
renewed team and a generational change with a new, young director, Yves 
Bertocini, Notre Europe however remained conceptually aligned to classical 
paradigms of EU integration thinking. This also pertains to La Fondation Robert 
Schumann, directed by Jean-Dominique Giuliani, which in essence resembles a 
French promotion center of the EU. Lastly, the Fondapol has been launched in the 
last decade and is less a non-partisan research institute, but closely aligned to the 
French UMP party (now: Les Républicains) and was meant to imitate the German 
structure of party-affiliated foundations (such as Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung or 
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung). Thus, EuropaNova is, generally, the only new, dynamic 
and, over the past decade, active member in the French political arena with the 
self-declared aim to shake up European thinking in France. This is in an 
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environment that traditionally lacks a dense think tank community, as well as 
‘deep society’ structures with respect to the organization of civil society, 
comparable to countries such as Germany with visible policy impact. 
e) Friends of Europe 
Friends of Europe (FoE) is – next to the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) 
and the European Policy Centre (EPC) – one of the oldest and most established 
Brussels-based think tanks in the field of European policy, but has undergone a 
change towards a more youthful team. Created in 1999, Friends of Europe aimed at 
a pan-European version of think tank vis-à-vis the perceived Anglo-Saxon (and 
Eurosceptic) scene of think tanks. The organization is much larger than the other 
think tanks in the sample; it reports an annual income of more than 2 million 
Euros, 33 per cent of which are from corporate sources. Most of the income is from 
public sources and the organization relies on half-a-million Euros from its 
members. Nineteen officials direct work in areas of the environment, knowledge, 
technology, and security policy. The well-connected board relies on ranking 
politicians from Brussels and the member states, covering a range of center-left 
and center-right perspectives. The think tank claims participation of over 5,000 
speakers and participants, 60 events, 50 publications and over 200 op-eds every 
year. Their website has over 6M unique visitors, a 330,000-strong Facebook and 
Twitter community and 80,000 plus contacts, including senior decision makers 
from the EU, national governments and international institutions, NGOs, think 
tanks, universities, business and the media. Friends of Europe has merged with 
the Security & Defence Agenda in 2014, and recently created an online debating 
platform, thus combining the group of think tanks in this study with the group of 
debating platforms. 
1.3 The links between pro-European think tanks and other think tanks 
In order to analyze how these think tanks form a network, we conducted a social 
network analysis. This social science method is used to observe how close actors 
are positioned towards each other and in what way they have relationships with 
each other.  
While such relationships can be of different character, we focused first on 
interlocking directorates of advisory and scientific board members of the five 
think tanks, as well as other think tank employees and activists. While working on 
joint projects might be of equal importance in determining a connection between 
two organizations, interlocking board membership can reveal a structural and 
longtime relationship. Having two positions in different organizations also 
indicates that such individuals have better access to information and resources. 
Therefore, it can be a strategic asset for organizations to coordinate their actions 
effectively.  
Turning to the relationships formed by the five think tanks under analysis, we 
see hardly any interlocking directorates. As figure 1 reveals, only three 
individuals are in a position to bridge some of the organizations. While Mrs. 
Guérot has a board membership in both European Alternatives and Todiktio, the 
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Italian politician, Sandro Gozi, connects EuropaNova and Todiktio, while the 
Spanish socialist politician, Javier Solana, connects Friends of Europe and PDU. 
Thus, we observe two separate formations, but no interlock positions are visible 
that could connect all five think tanks. The new right-wing think tank networks 
advocating (partial) disintegration perspectives in comparison are closely 
integrated across borders with many interlocking directorates (Plehwe 2015).12  
Figure 1: Social network of the five think tanks 
 
 
 
Source: Own compilation 
As these think tanks are concerned with Europe that entails a pro-European 
perspective for further integration, we also analyzed how far their individual 
members hold positions in think tanks that are organized in the European party 
foundation networks13. Also, we checked for membership in two neo-liberal and 
conservative partisan networks that are active on the European level. These are 
the Stockholm Network and the European Ideas Network (EIN). As figure 2 shows, 
we find several connections towards think tanks that are part of the European 
party networks. Eight individuals are also members of the Foundation for 
European Progressive Studies (FEPS) associated with the Socialists and Democrats 
party, which are formed by Friends of Europe, Todiktio and PDU. While a 
                                                 
12  Short of institutional cross-linkages, several of the pro-European think tanks do collaborate. The 
joint petition for “Europe: a new version is avaliable” was co-written by Daphne Büllesbach and 
Nora Rathje (EA), Benjamin Zeeb (PDU) and Victoria Kupsch of the more recently founded 
Democracy Lab. 
13  These are, namely: Foundation for European Progressive Studies (S&D); the Transform Network 
(GE/NGL); the Green European Foundation (European Green Party); the New Direction Foundation 
(ECR); the European Liberal Forum; the Liberal Democrats; and Wilfried Martens Centre for 
European Studies (EPP). 
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connection with the social-democratic spectrum is not surprising, it is interesting 
to see that the Transform Network is not present within the network. And while 
the Green European Foundation forms one interlocking directorate with Friends of 
Europe, we see that the European Liberal Forum, as well as the Centre for 
European Studies, is equally represented at Friends of Europe. Friends of Europe 
thus appear to be situated squarely within the centrist spectrum of politics, which 
does not lead us to expect strong departures from mainstream positions on 
European integration. Possibly to the contrary, both Stockholm Network and the 
European Ideas Network, which feature partial disintegration perspectives, share 
personnel with Friends of Europe and Todiktio. However, the new right-wing 
network of the European Conservatives and Reformers, which calls for partial 
disintegration, is also not represented.  
Figure 2: Social network analysis of five think tanks and European party foundation 
networks 
 
 
Source: Own compilation 
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Importantly, the network analysis reveals that there are few interlock positions 
between the „old“ European think tank community (CEPS, EPC etc.) and the 
younger and more progressive one. This could indicate a lack of communication 
across the various communities and leads to assume a certain generational divide 
in the (pro-)European discourse coalitions. 
Although many of the organizations under review are working across Europe, 
we can easily detect a certain bias of Western European home countries. Only 
Todiktio has origins in the European periphery (Greece) and, thus, we may miss 
some of the post-crisis developments in Central and Eastern Europe, for example. 
In this study we could only include English, French and German language 
publications due to time and capacity constraints14. A Polish organization has been 
included (Krytyka Polityczna) in the “echo chamber analysis” of debating 
platforms/magazines, which differ from the first group in that they are not 
publishing material in their own name. Political Critique offers English language 
material, fortunately. This second group of organizations was likewise founded 
after the crisis, however. We will examine these debating platforms in order to see 
if and to what extent the conceptual work on the future of Europe emanating from 
the group of think tanks listed above is taken up in a related (progressive, pro-
European, online) media environment.  
Table 2: Pro-European platforms, type, countries, founding 
Name Type of organization Country/countries Year 
Eutopia (Eurozine) journal Germany, Italy, Spain 2015 
Publixphere collaborative weblog Germany 2013 
OneEurope debating platform Germany (and across 
Europe) 
2011 
Krytyka Polityczna 
(Political Critique) 
online magazine Poland 2002 
Future Lab Europe online platform Brussels 2011 
Source: Own compilation 
a) Eutopia 
Eutopia was launched in cooperation with the publishing houses of Laterza (Italy) 
and Suhrkamp (Germany). Eutopia lasted until the end of 2015 at which point was 
then terminated due to budget constraints. The publishing houses failed to make a 
commercially viable endeavor out of the online magazine. The previously existing 
Eurozine platform remains as a link to cultural magazines.  
b) Publixphere 
Publixphere is a discussion network founded in 2013 by Mayte Schomburg, a 
European law student, who wanted to create an interactive European discussion 
forum, especially targeting young people who felt alienated with classical parties. 
Publixphere, who had to close their office at the end of 2015 due to lack of 
                                                 
14  We would like to gratefully acknowledge funding from the Think Tank Fund located in Budapest, 
Hungary. This funding enabled us to employ research assistants and to construct a complex 
database in support of our conceptual analysis of think tank output. 
 
  15 
financing (the initial money came from the Mercator Foundation), considered 
itself as a neutral discussion platform with edited posts on a variety of themes, 
with no political agenda of its own. The goal was to promote a cross-border 
understanding and discussion and to pave the way for a European public sphere 
and space for common understanding and discussion. 
c) Krytyka Polityczna (Political Critque) 
Krytyka Polityczna is a left-wing, progressive discussion platform in Poland 
founded in 2002 by Slawomir Sierakowski. The organization is now led by the 
Director Jaroslaw Stowirej. Funded, among others, by the Open Society Institution, 
Krytyka Polityczna is, altogether: a think tank; a platform for cultural events and 
policy debates in four Polish towns; a publishing house essentially translating 
books into Polish (e.g. Stiglitz, Piketty etc.); a policy institute publishing policy 
papers mainly on European themes (to a certain degree in the spirit of liberal arts 
in the US); and is expanding currently to Ukraine. Krytyka Polityczna is an 
institution in Poland, vigorously defending and securing open and rule-of-law 
based Polish public opinion. 
d) OneEurope 
Launched in 2011, OneEurope is an initiative by Cherian Grundmann. OneEurope 
has evolved into a network of students and young academics concerned with the 
current state of the EU. The OneEurope project is essentially feeding a European-
wide online platform, allowing the exchange of cross-border information about 
what is happening in other countries (e.g. young Albanians report on policy 
initiatives, anti-corruption measures, visa policies etc.). The platform also serves 
as a contact base (e.g. for the search of internships etc.). Most OneEurope 
contributors endorse the need for one European government while the editorial 
board does not embrace any political stance towards the EU. It is registered as a 
non-profit association by German law. OneEurope has only recently started to 
organize teambuilding workshops funded by EU grants. OneEurope is visible in the 
European online sphere and runs on a basic level of donations. All activities are 
carried out by volunteers who form an inner circle of decision makers with regard 
to the direction of the platform. The organization aims to provide space for 
European debate and looks to expand critical European participation in order to 
improve the quality of the debate on important European issues. 
e) Future Lab Europe 
Future Lab has been created by the European Alliance for Democratic Citizenship, 
which is backed by a number of large (corporate) foundations including King 
Baudoins Foundation, Robert Bosch Stiftung and maintains a partnership with 
Süddeutsche Zeitung in Germany15. Approximately 100 participants below the age 
of 30 are selected yearly to contribute to the proceedings. The project is managed 
by the European Policy Centre on behalf of the Network of European Foundations.  
The distinction between think tanks and debating platforms is not easy to 
discern in our case. Friends of Europe, for example, have also developed a debating 
                                                 
15  http://www.FutureLabeurope.eu/partners.html (retrieved on 28th October 2016). 
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platform as part of the think tank, and Krytyka Polityczna maintains a range of 
think tank activities in addition to the maintenance of a debating platform. We 
consider the difference mainly to be of importance with regard to the question of 
identification of the organization with published statements. In the case of 
debating platforms, a publication cannot be attributed to the publishing site. In 
order to identify organizations with relevant conceptual work we are interested in 
concentrating on organizations that claim to provide direction for Europe in some 
way. The platforms are interesting to examine in order to see, if, and in which 
ways, new concepts and ideas find a sympathetic audience and reverberate in 
discussions maintained by a predominantly pro-European crowd, consisting 
mostly of centrist and left-leaning persuasions. 
Alternatively, our sample can be considered the typical advocacy form of think 
tanks. Except for Friends of Europe, which commands considerable staff and 
resources devoted to research in a number of fields, the think tanks in our sample 
are relatively small, featuring a staff of two or three people (10 in the case of 
European Alternatives), small supervisory/advisory boards and limited 
transparency in terms of budgets and funding. Only European Alternatives 
provides full information on its budget of about 800.000 Euros.16 Even the left 
leaning think tank has considerable support from corporate foundations like 
Allianz-Kulturstiftung. Except for FoE, none of the think tanks has a strong 
membership base. In terms of finance, the organizations can, therefore, be 
considered limited. There are considerable constraints in terms of capacity and 
autonomy in carrying out activities as a result, particularly if one compares the 
organizations to (environmental) NGOs with a strong membership and donor base, 
such as Greenpeace. 
Several think tanks work across Europe, whether it is transnational projects 
like the European festivals in 15 cities (European Alternatives), national member 
organizations (Friends of Europe), or informal offices (PDU). Even the debating 
platforms operate with transnational networks, such as over 200 former Erasmus 
students of OneEurope. There are few personal interlocks linking this group of 
organizations; Javier Solana is mentioned by PDU and Todiktio, for example. Few 
maintain official partnerships (like Todiktio and Friends of Europe), but many 
think tank officials in the sample know each other and have worked together on 
occasions in the past. Paradoxically, interlocking positions across borders appear 
to be far more common in the new right-wing think tank world advocating 
(partial) disintegration (Plehwe and Schlögl 2014).  
Even though there are few formal links, we can observe intellectual and 
conceptual interconnections between pro-European think tanks, which claim to 
represent a new generation (generation Erasmus). In one interview, Benjamin Zeeb 
of PDU claimed that this new generation has to bridge a yawning gap between the 
young and the founding father generation (interview three). 
                                                 
16  Compare: www.euroalter.com/who-we-are/our-organisation/our-funders (retrieved on 28th 
October 2016), and www.euroalter.com/wp (retrieved on 28th October 2016), and https:// 
euroalter.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/EuropeanAlternativesaccountsfor2015approvedby-
members.docx.pdf (retrieved on 28th October 2016). 
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To a certain extent, the fledgling pro-European think tanks seem to mutually 
influence each other with strong features of reciprocity and the common goal to 
shift paradigms in the current EU agenda. We will first try now to get a better 
sense of the scope of the work these center-left think tanks have conducted since 
the crisis. To this end we have examined a total of more than 1,328 documents 
published by the group of five think tanks. The following table provides an 
overview, ranked according to publishing activity.  
Table 3: Pro-European think tanks, total output 2006-2016 
Name Number of documents 
European Alternatives 732 
Project for a Democratic Union 387 
Friends of Europe 182 
EuropaNova 17 
Todiktio 10 
Total 1328 
Source: Own compilation, publications before 2010 were no longer available on the websites. 
The ranking should not be considered as a hierarchy. Most of the publishing is 
blog material with relatively short articles on a wide range of issues. The number 
of publications from EuropaNova and Todiktio is small by comparison, for 
example, but some of the publications are more substantial than many of the 
publications listed for the other organizations. 
The pro-European think tanks cover a wide range of topics. Of course, there is 
a strong concern for the European dimension of democracy and politics in general, 
but it is quite interesting to observe the areas of concentration. We attributed 
about 100 key words to the individual publications and grouped the resulting list 
of themes in the clusters displayed in figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Number of articles in categories 
 
Source: Own compilation 
Apart from the focus on issues of European governance, culture and society 
themes contribute highly to our sample, as well as social and economic themes. 
The miscellaneous category is a residual category of keywords we were unable to 
group together and naturally cover a wide range of themes and issues. Foreign 
policy and security themes do play a small role, and an even smaller role is played 
by, surprisingly, environmental policy issues.  
Can we observe a shift in the concentration of themes? The following count in 
figure 4 looks at publications per year sorted by the major categories employed. 
The time span is short, of course. Only three organizations existed from 2010-
2013, and data for 2016 is incomplete due to our cut-of point (in June). However, 
let us look at the data: Figure 2 shows a peak of publications in 2014, and an 
obvious increase from 2012 onwards. We can also see a decline in coverage of 
economic issues after a peak in this area in 2013.  
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Figure 4: Article topics per year 
 
Source: Own compilation 
 
The output by these think tanks is quite heterogeneous. Most publications in our 
database have been scraped from the website; most publications are blog entries 
and other short documents. In order to answer the questions raised in this paper, 
however, we need publications that engage topics in a rather detailed 
(philosophical-political) way. In fact, when looking for more profound conceptual 
work, only about 60 longer articles could be considered, since much of the work 
published can be qualified as reporting and commenting (although this does not 
diminish the importance of these activities). However, with regard to our key 
question, namely if and in which ways do these think tanks contribute to new 
conceptual ideas in relation to European integration, only a small part of the 
publications can be considered relevant. All the publications have nevertheless 
been attributed keywords in order to sort publications by subject matter. To get a 
better idea of each think tank’s profile, we will display the distribution of 
publications across categories employed in figure 1 at the individual level. We 
start with European Alternatives. 
 
Euralter has a strong profile in the area of governance, culture, society and social 
issues. The number of publications on economic subjects is considerably lower, 
including a marginal amount for other topics. The economic topic is interesting, 
however. Niccolo Milanese (interview one) explained that Euralter aims to 
overcome a reductionist perspective of economics. Economic topics are not 
isolated from other matters. Therefore, the categorization should be taken with a 
grain of salt; it serves the purpose only as a very general overview.  
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Table 4: Publications of European Alternatives 
Thematic field Number of publications 
Governance/Institutions/Composition 216 
Culture/Society 153 
Social/Education/Health 150 
Miscellaneous 112 
Economics 76 
Countries/EU International 10 
Ecology/Environmentalism 10 
Defence/Security 5 
Source: Own compilation 
The next organization is the Project of a Democratic Union (PDU). Again, we find 
the top activities in the fields of European institutions are democracy and 
governance on the one hand, and culture on the other. 
Table 5: Publications of Project for a Democratic Union  
Thematic field Number of publications 
Governance/Institutions/Composition 255 
Culture/Society 84 
Economics 20 
Defence/Security 11 
Ecology/Environmentalism 6 
Countries/EU International 5 
Miscellaneous  4 
Social/Education/Health 2 
Source: Own compilation 
Our third organization, Friends of Europe, is the first think tank with quite a 
different publication profile.  
Table 6: Publications of Friends of Europe 
Thematic field Number of publications 
Economics 50 
Ecology/Environmentalism 43 
Defence/Security 30 
Governance/Institutions/Composition 24 
Social/Education/Health 15 
Culture/Society 11 
Miscellaneous 7 
Countries/EU International 2 
Source: Own compilation 
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In striking contrast to the previous think tanks, economics and environmental 
issues are most prominent in the FoE profile, followed by European security and 
governance issues. As a part of a new strategy, FoE embraced the policy journal 
Europe World and the Security & Defence Agenda in 2014, which helps to explain 
the relatively high number of publications in the field of defence/security.  
 
What remains are the smaller organizations. Firstly, we look at EuropaNova. 
Table 7: Publications of EuropaNova 
Thematic field Number of publications 
Governance/Institutions/Composition 9 
Social/Education/Health 5 
Economics 2 
Ecology/Environmentalism 1 
Source: Own compilation 
Again, European Governance tops the list, followed by social concerns. The last 
think tank is Todiktio. 
Table 8: Publications of Todiktio 
Thematic field Number of publications 
Economics 5 
Governance/Institutions/Composition 4 
Countries/EU International 1 
Source: Own compilation 
Thus, in all think tanks except FOE, European institutions, democracy and 
governance are the most prominent topics. The three most active think tanks in 
terms of number of publications are prominently featuring culture/society issues 
as well. Economic questions related to public services, economic democracy and 
alternatives to neoliberal single market/free trade presently focused on by the EU 
are in third place, although a range of European citizenship and social issues does 
not trail far behind. Environmental themes are not a major concern except for 
Friends of Europe, surprisingly. There is also quite a lot of attention on defence 
and security issues, as well as foreign policy in the work of Friends of Europe and 
Project for a Democratic Union in particular. 
Based on the findings regarding the frequency of topics, we might suspect 
conceptual work and innovation in the fields of European democracy, civil society, 
economy and citizenship/social policy. What do we find reading the published 
papers closely? 
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2 Conceptual innovations for a new Europe? 
Turning to the work done by the pro-European think tanks to develop new 
(political) concepts, we are dealing with a small portion of the total output, since 
many publications are reporting on events etc. To qualify as a conceptual effort, 
we need to find reflections on concepts that characterize the European polity, 
economy, society and so on, while developing a new aspect, not only reflecting 
certain concepts, which of course all publications do. In order to qualify as a 
potentially new conceptualization we also need to find statements subjecting 
available or existing concepts to critical scrutiny, in order to argue a new and 
different perspective.17 
Figure 5: Depiction of conceptual development 
 
Source: Own graphical composition 
To deal with new conceptualization requires intellectual work beyond demanding 
a new policy, for example, although the demand for a new policy can be 
considered an operationalization of new concepts if abstract considerations are 
concretized this way. We follow an inductive approach since we do not know 
beforehand in which areas new European integration concepts are developed. 
Based on criticism of standing EU concepts (as laid down in the acquis 
communautaire, treaties, common or mainstream understanding of European 
integration) by think tank publications, we will attempt to clarify the distance of a 
new conceptualization to the present EU configuration on the one hand, and we 
will also see if and how the think tank conceptualization compares with 
mainstream thinking about the future (based on a number of reflections that can 
be considered close to the EU institutions (like the Five Presidents’ Report, Spinelli 
Report by MEPs, and centrist expert/advisor circles like Glienicke Group).  
Key concepts of course are the subject of study in conceptual history. The work 
done by Cambridge University and Bielefeld scholars in particular has yielded a 
detailed understanding of the formation and transformation of key concepts 
mostly since the enlightenment epoch, as a result of and subject to social 
struggles18. The recent and present struggle over European integration is a 
comparatively short period of time, of course. Yet we can assume that certain 
ambiguities in the traditional European integration discourse become clearer due 
to the crisis, and we expect to see efforts of reinterpretation on the left in reaction 
to both apparent weaknesses of EU status quo and the (partial) disintegration or 
re-nationalization challenge on the right.  
                                                 
17  Compare Freeden (1996, p. 48) on the analysis of political concepts. 
18  For example, see: https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geschichtliche_Grundbegriffe. 
Standing 
European 
integration 
  
Critical 
discussion  
New 
conceptualization 
aspect 
 
  23 
From all the documents we selected, 53 qualified for our key criteria: 
consciously discussing concepts and distinct ideas from prevailing notions (e.g. 
directing attention to the democratic deficit of the EU and proposing a real 
transnational democracy). Many of these documents also identify what could be 
considered increasing the comprehensiveness of, or adaptations to, core concepts 
like transnational democracy; we found efforts to operationalize concepts (e.g. 
more concrete political programs). The number of publications ultimately 
considered relevant for this study in any case is much smaller than the total 
number. The 53 (somewhat) longer publications (total of about 400 pages) seemed 
to meet the criteria, although we remained unconvinced of half of these cases if 
the criteria mentioned were fully met (e.g. clearly new concepts without 
discussion of status quo presents a problem because it is unclear if and to which 
extent we are really dealing with conceptual work). On the final count of 
qualifying material we established five areas of conceptual work evident in our 
sample: 
• Expanded European citizenship (universal and inviolable 
citizenship/resident rights) 
14 of the publications suspected to contain conceptual work; 
• Transnational democracy/institutional primacy of Europe 
17 of the suspected publications; 
• European public interest economy/economic democracy 
13 of the suspected publications; 
• Transnational civic/public sphere 
8 of the suspected publications; 
• Europe as central power in global political economy 
1 document19. 
  
                                                 
19  The total is more than the 57 documents as one publication clearly covers two (or more) areas. 
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Figure 6 depicts the process of finding text that entails new concepts on European 
integration. 
Figure 6: Process of selecting texts entailing conceptual work 
 
Source: Own graphical composition 
At first glance it is interesting to observe a discrepancy between the focus of 
publication activities vis-à-vis the focus on reconceptualization. In terms of 
conceptual efforts, a clear priority is in the field of European citizenship and 
social policy followed by transnational democracy, which was by far the core 
area of publication activities. Efforts to reconceptualize Europe’s economy 
(European public interest economy) are more central again to the conceptual 
work than to the general publication effort. Instead, culture and society featured 
prominently in general publications, but play a minor role only in the conceptual 
effort. Europe’s position in the world was a minor concern in publication activity, 
but it does figure in the conceptual field unlike, for example, Europe’s ecological 
system.  
The following sections will look at each of the five areas in somewhat greater 
detail to clarify if and in which ways the work published by this group of think 
tanks can be considered developing new ideas with regard to European 
integration.  
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2.1 Expanded European citizenship 
The concept of European citizenship is presently considered as “additional” to 
national citizenship of member states. The European Commission Directorate-
General for Justice clearly states that:  
“Any person who holds the nationality of an EU country is automatically also an 
EU citizen. EU citizenship is additional to and does not replace national 
citizenship. It is for each EU country to lay down the conditions for the 
acquisition and loss of nationality of that country.” (European Commission n.d.) 
Core rights include: free movement; non-discrimination on the basis of 
nationality where the treaty applies; voting for the EP; and, petitioning the EP and 
the European Ombudsman. Free movement and residency rights have been limited 
for new members for certain periods of time in the past and are currently subject 
to discussion by Eurosceptic forces who object to the labor migration from 
countries like Poland or Romania to countries like the UK, for example. Moreover, 
both the UK and Germany are currently considering a reduction of social welfare 
benefits for recent immigrants who did not (yet) contribute long enough to social 
security when they became unemployed. While not directly limiting free mobility 
and residency within the EU, such measures are intended to reduce incentives for 
migrating to better welfare regimes20.  
Other debates center on the limitations of citizenship rights; many who live in 
the EU are not citizens of member states and, consequently, not EU citizens despite 
possibly residing in Europe for a reasonable length of time. Debates regarding 
citizenship also include the issues on equality of different groups of residents, 
including migrant workers, war refugees and asylum seekers.  
What are the positions we can find in our pro-European think tank sample on 
this conceptual field? The high number of publications containing conceptual 
work in this field certainly raises expectations with regard to the content. The 
following table provides a list of the source material for our analysis. 
Table 9: Expanded European citizenship (universal and inviolable citizenship/resident 
rights) 
Think tank Number of relevant publications 
European Alternatives 5 
EuropaNova 3 
Friends of Europe  0 
Project for a Democratic Union 0 
Todiktio 0 
Total 8 
Source: Own compilation 
                                                 
20  http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/andrea-nahles-will-sozialhilfe-fuer-eu-auslaender-
einschraenken-a-1089731.html (retrieved on 28th October 2016), and http://www.euractiv.com/ 
section/uk-europe/news/cameron-cuts-eu-migrants-unemployment-and-child-benefits/ 
(retrieved on 28th October 2016). 
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The key document in our sample clearly is the Citizens' Manifesto for European 
Democracy, Solidarity and Equality published by European Alternatives. We find a 
rather comprehensive reform idea regarding European citizenship and the social 
policy field. The authors emphasize that the present state of the European social 
system is highly fragmented and uneven and should be replaced by: 
“... a European welfare system that ensures a set of social and economic rights 
which meet people’s basic needs irrespective of their circumstances and place of 
residence, such as unemployment and pension benefits, minimum wage or basic 
income.” (European Alternatives 2014, p. 8) 
Several other documents of European Alternatives detail rights to be obtained for 
migrants, LBGT communities and ethnic minorities such as Roma21. This includes a 
higher harmonization for the protection of refugees with detailed 
recommendations stated in 2012, before the refugee crisis took place22. The 
manifesto clearly aims at expanding European citizenship to cover social groups 
in novel ways and to include residents who are not citizens. The reasoning aims 
at:  
“… enabling all residents and citizens to become actors for change at EU level and 
enjoy adequate protection for equal access to fundamental rights, regardless of 
their gender, gender identity and expression, sexual orientation, social or ethnic 
background, place of origin.” (ibid., p. 10) 
In a similar direction, EuropaNova calls for resident citizenship rather than 
member state citizenship in its publication “A Europe that dares … in the interests 
of Europeans - 60 practical propositions to build a European power” (EuropaNova, 
2010, p. 43). Also, we find strong support for strengthening minority rights, which 
goes hand-in-hand in reforming the educational system and mobility rights. 
Herein, they call for a European budget to better coordinate migrants coming from 
outside of Europe.  
Beyond a more inclusive understanding of European citizenship we find a 
somewhat rudimentary conceptualization of a European social citizenship model, 
along the lines of TH Marshall’s reflection on the “equality principle” of social 
citizenship (Marshall, 1949). In “Labour and Social Europe”, European Alternatives 
(2011, p. 1) calls for social minimum standards, but they are still considered in a 
national framework (median income level as key to entitlements). European 
Alternatives also connects its conceptual notion of social minimum standards to 
the mainstream ‘flexicurity’ discourse (minimum standards are held to be part of 
it), but observes that there are still countries lacking social minimum wages, for 
example. 
We thus find clear indications of new notions of Expanded European 
citizenship in two areas. Firstly, the exclusive character of national citizenship as 
                                                 
21  See for example; https://euroalter.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Pamphlet_LGBT_for_prin 
t.pdf (retrieved on 28th October 2016). 
22  European Alternatives (2011), Common Asylum Policy in the EU, https://euroalter.com/-
2011/common-asylum-policy-in-the-eu (retrieved on 28th October 2016). 
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a basis of the added European dimension is challenged by way of promoting 
notions of resident citizenship and attention to discriminations that are presently 
not sufficiently addressed in the EU. Secondly, we find notions pointing to 
European social citizenship ideas at distance to the patterns of nation-state based 
minimum standards. However, we cannot detect a clear understanding of a 
principled or full-fledged European social citizenship, let alone roadmaps to move 
into such a direction. A possible exception in terms of relating social citizenship to 
the larger debate on the relation of capitalism and welfare is addressed by the 
European Alternatives publication “Decommodifying labor”, which draws on the 
welfare state literature, but limits the discussion to precarious work.  
2.2 Mainstream analysis: Expanded European citizenship 
How does the conceptual work exhibited by the group of pro-European think 
tanks in the area of European citizenship compare with mainstream reflections on 
the future?  
Although the effects of the economic crisis on citizens are often referred to in 
the mainstream literature, the concept of European citizenship and a 
strengthening of it are, except for the Spinelli Group, not addressed in the 
mainstream documents.  
Social concerns come into play in discussions related to labor markets and 
increasing internal labor migration. The Glienicker Group argues that “Germany 
should not have to complain about a lack of skilled workers when many skilled 
workers are unemployed in Spain” (Glienicker Group 2013). The group proposes 
language courses and the provision of additional training, but does not call for a 
fundamental change with regard to stronger social support for freedom of 
movement and residency. Although a recalibration of the EU labor markets and a 
concern for unemployment is high on the agenda in the Five Presidents’ Report, 
new ideas for more universal and social citizenship are not promoted by this 
group of European leaders (p. 8-9). Enderlein and Pisani-Ferry only call for a 
“rediscovery of European values”, (Enderlein and Pisani-Ferry 2014, p. 4) which 
includes the implementation of common labor and social security standards (e.g. 
minimum wage). At the same time, the authors see the need for convergence 
between German and French regulations in particular, including a reduction of 
wage levels in France. In the case of France, they suggest the adoption of a 
‘flexicurity model’ in order to restructure labor-markets (p. 3). Furthermore, we 
see a promotion of active labor market policies and vocational training for both 
countries (p. 41). The Five Presidents’ Report expresses similar concerns for social 
policies calling for “effective social protection systems in place to protect the most 
vulnerable in society, including a ‘social protection floor’ (p. 8). In this way the 
report wants Europe to attain a ‘social triple A’ (ibid.). Especially in the area of 
labor policies, we again find references to the need of balancing between security 
and a flexibility of labor contracts.  
Another important topic for the Five Presidents' Report and Enderlein and 
Pisani-Ferry is the aging population in Europe and the resulting pressures on the 
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retirement models. Only a small acknowledgment of the dimension of 
demographic changes can be found in the Five Presidents' Report. “Major reforms, 
[…] aligning the retirement age with life expectancy” (p. 9) are the only idea in this 
area, which translates into a later retirement age. National solutions are proposed 
again by Enderlein and Pisani-Ferry for Germany: expanding the labor force 
(increasing net migration, retirement age and female labor participation) and 
increasing total factor productivity. This includes targeting specific, skilled 
foreign workers to improve the supply side of the German labor market. Instead of 
thinking about expanded social citizenship we thus find market-oriented ideas 
along the lines of the past decades. 
Only the Spinelli Group devotes one chapter to progressive changes in 
European citizenship. The group claims that the power of federalism envisioned 
by the group comes from “its states and its citizens”. The prospective upgrading of 
European citizenship includes easier access of individuals to the Court of Justice, 
the extension of voting rights to individuals living outside their country of origin 
and an extended mandate of the European Ombudsman to defend citizens (2013, 
p. 17). The Spinelli Group, thus, falls way short of the demands for expanded and 
social citizenship we find in the pro-European think tanks under investigation. 
Contrasting the legal and social dimensions of the European citizenship 
discourse we can clearly see quite different concerns voiced by the authors of 
European Alternatives and EuropaNova in particular, and the mainstream 
conceptualizations. While the mainstream documents maintain a flexicurity model 
of social minimum standards at national levels mostly concerned with labor 
market needs, and a limited improvement of legal citizen rights (maintaining legal 
citizen exclusivity), authors from two of the think tanks studied move in new and 
generally more progressive directions: more comprehensive resident rights and 
rights for groups of people currently suffering from discrimination are 
conceptualized alongside a rudimentary notion of improving European social 
citizenship. Only the Spinelli Group linked to the EP overlaps with regard to 
notions of expanded European citizenship.  
2.3 Transnational democracy 
The European Union, arguably, is the first - if somewhat rudimentary - post-
national democracy worldwide. Apart from national parliaments, European 
citizens elect members of the European Parliament, which has experienced a 
considerable expansion of power in European legislative processes over the years. 
The expansion of majority voting in the European Council has been accompanied 
with the expansion of the co-decision procedure, which enables the parliament to 
play a major role in the revision of proposed legislation. At the same time the 
debate surrounding the democratic deficit of the EU is legend. The EP does not 
have the classical right of initiating legislation. In many important areas, like 
competition law and foreign policy, the Parliament can only be consulted. The 
budget rights are quite limited, partly due to the relatively small budget of the EU. 
Moreover, the EP is elected on a strictly national basis and European political 
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parties are weak multinational groups, rather than real transnational party 
formations. The weakness of the Parliament, vis-à-vis both the Commission and 
the European Council, has been reinforced after the crisis. The new economic 
governance procedures are, again, subject to intergovernmental rule instead of 
the “community method” of sharing decision making power between Commission, 
Council, and European Parliament.  
What do the pro-European think tanks address in this area? The following 
table contains the list of publications on which we can draw in the analysis: 
Table 10: Transnational democracy/institutional primacy of Europe 
Think tank Number of relevant publications 
Project for democratic union 5 
European Alternatives 4 
Todiktio 2 
EuropaNova 0 
Friends of Europe 0 
Total 11 
Source: Own compilation 
We can start once again with European Alternatives, which has a clear conception 
of transnational democracy. In its document “Towards a transnational democracy 
for Europe” we find considerations dedicated to the creation/deepening of 
transnational democracy. At the core of the concept stands a notion of equal access 
of each citizen to the resources of information and decision-making. Current 
circumstances are considered to constitute a crisis of European democratic 
structures and to undermine citizens' trust in European institutions. Instead of 
Europe’s democracy being conducive to citizen interests and subject to 
transparent and open procedures, European Alternatives observes the dominance 
of economic interests and especially the power of the financial markets. The 
economic configuration results in national fragmentation and a more unequal 
development of nation states.  
"So far citizens across Europe are only offered two perspectives to partake in this 
process: on the one hand a deeper integration of the EU on the basis of 
competition, deregulation and liberalization without democracy and on the other 
[hand] the threat of disintegration of the European space. Unless this dichotomy 
is opposed with positive counter proposals on a transnational basis, it is very 
difficult to see how any member state or minority coalition of the Union can 
break this logic which has enlisted the financial markets as its firepower. We need 
to struggle for the construction of a Europe where citizens, social forces, 
movements and associations return to have a say over their collective future; a 
Europe based on real democratic and political processes, able to interrupt the 
hegemony of austerity and reformulate the way out of our multiple crises.” 
(European Alternatives 2013, p. 7) 
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Thus, the document clearly links democracy to economic power structures in 
contemporary capitalism (despite missing broader global influences on the 
European economy), and specifically identifies financial markets as a threat to 
democratic development.  
Such arguments can also be found in “a tennis court oath for Europe”. Here 
European Alternatives links the ability of treaty changes to economic interests, 
including those of strong economic actors:  
“We need to move beyond the collective hypnosis that European treaties cannot 
be modified. In principle there is a peculiar alignment of interests for 
institutional change. It is not just in the interest of the left, or of the most 
indebted countries, to democratise economic decision-making and open the door 
to common European economic and social policies. It is equally in the interest of 
the most economically successful sectors, which are jeopardizing their welfare by 
locking-in a system of governance that perpetuates bad decision-making for 
most.” (European Alternatives 2015) 
Apart from the exploration of inter-class coalitions in support of democracy 
enhancing treaty changes, European Alternatives also claims that a deepening of 
transnational democracy cannot be realized by political elites only. According to 
European Alternatives, social movements of active and informed citizenry are 
required to achieve significant progress. 
"Movements reacting to the economic crisis lack a developed proposal for a 
democratic institutional infrastructure in Europe: a democratic infrastructure 
which guarantees the common interest of Europeans at a continental scale, 
reinforces political agency of Europeans by empowering them to take part in 
European politics, and which restores democratic political control and oversight 
over financial markets and capital… Such a proposal for a democratic 
institutional infrastructure cannot be developed by a small number of experts or 
technocrats, but must be a broad and collaborative constitutional process 
involving the maximum of citizens” (European Alternatives 2013, p. 12-13). 
EuropaNova supports such a position in writings on expanded social welfare, 
calling for stronger participatory elements in the formulation of social policies. 
This is especially true for recipients of social welfare provisions (EuropaNova 
2010, p. 19).  
Project of a Democratic Union emphasizes the imbalance between Germany 
and the European periphery, specifically demanding a move towards a federal 
system. In its statement of principles, PDU aims both at a more powerful and more 
democratic union by way of far reaching institutional reforms. Apart from a 
parliamentary system, PDU has clear ideas about strengthening Europe’s role in 
global institutions and international affairs. Current co-existence of national and 
European delegations in international organizations like the IMF or NATO are 
foreseen to be consolidated at the European level. PDU thus has a clear notion of 
centralization of European power in addition to reforming the democratic system 
of voting and decision making. The relationship between European domestic and 
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international reform requirements remains unclear. PDU’s core idea with regard 
to historical success of Anglo-Saxon unification relates to common debt policies 
and common foreign policies (interview three). A more fully developed federal 
democracy can be considered a necessary pre-condition for both. 
Yet another dimension of transnational democracy has been addressed by 
European Alternatives in the work on organized crime. A document titled “Legality 
and struggle against organized crime” conceptualizes a need to cope with the 
transnational phenomenon of illegal economy by way of setting up a transnational 
regime of persecution and confiscation. Confiscated assets are liquidated and the 
proceeds are dedicated to social purposes.  
Todiktio’s published work refers to its president Henrik Enderlein (and to 
Gerhard Cromme). The writing emphasizes risks that endangers the very existence 
of the EU (i.e. complacency, blame games against member states, muddling 
through). Greater risk sharing and greater sovereignty sharing are demanded as a 
lesson from the crisis management. The argument remains very much on the 
institutional dimension of EMU completion. 
2.4 Mainstream analysis: Transnational democracy  
How do the findings of the conceptual work of the pro-European think tanks with 
regard to transnational democracy compare with the mainstream efforts? 
Except for the Spinelli Group, again, conceptualization of transnational European 
democracy and far reaching changes aiming at the primacy of EU institutions are 
not advocated by any of the authors in our mainstream collection, at least not in 
the sense of fundamental changes of the legal structure of the EU. Only the 
Spinelli Group calls on the EU “to reform fundamentally its constitutional 
architecture” (Spinelli Group 2013, p. 12) based on a “more federal structure” 
(ibid.) which is further defined as “[Not] centralized super state but, rather, a 
constitutional union in which different levels of democratic government are 
coordinated, not subordinated” (ibid.). 
The remaining documents feature propositions for a deepening of the 
European integration process concerning the EU institutions, which is regarded as 
a means to fight the European crisis. The Five Presidents' Report dedicates one 
chapter to “Democratic Accountability, Legitimacy and Institutional 
Strengthening” (p.16) and calls for more “plenary debates between the European 
Parliament (EP) and the Commission [...] before the annual growth survey [and on] 
country specific recommendations” (p.17). Such instruments of inter-institutional 
dialogue are also seen as a way to increase the interaction of the Commission with 
national parliaments (ibid.). Quite vaguely, the report calls upon the EP to 
“organize itself to assume its role in matters pertaining especially to the Euro 
area” (ibid.).  
A similar concern for democracy in Europe, yet more encompassing, is put 
forward by the Glienicker Group stating that “Democracy and the rule of law must 
be strengthened”. With reference to Hungary, the plea sees a need to more 
effectively enforce community law in the face of “[…] breaches of democratic or 
 
 32 
constitutional rules” (Glienicker Group 2013). The EU should be “equipped with a 
sanction mechanism” to ensure the rule of law in European member states.  
On a more technical level, the Spinelli Group calls for an increasing role of the 
European institutions as they propose to transfer powers from the Council to the 
Commission. They also want to extend the ordinary legislative procedure to more 
policy areas and increase the qualified majority thresholds both in the Parliament 
and the Council. Within the streamlined legislative process the EP and the Council 
gain the right to initiate new policy proposals, which is currently only restricted 
to the Commission. This can be seen as a strong move for a possible strengthening 
of agenda-setting powers. Furthermore, they argue for establishing transnational 
lists for EP elections in order “to create the missing link between electorate and 
the elected” (Spinelli Group 2013, p. 17). 
The Spinelli Group only thus features conceptual moves towards European 
federalism. All the other documents remain within the present framework, calling 
for soft measures mostly to increase the efficiency of the European institutions. 
Only with regard to community law enforcement are there calls for EU-level 
sanctions to ensure compliance in member states. The pro-European think tank 
debate thus appears to overlap to some extent with the (Spinelli group related) 
parliamentary debate, but is definitely going beyond the reform ideas presented 
in the mainstream documents by way of addressing the constraining relationship 
between the capitalist economy and the democratic aspirations of Europe. 
2.5 European public interest economy 
Since its foundation, economic development in the EU has always gained special 
prominence. The pooling of coal and steel production between Germany, France 
and Benelux Union was set up, as a clear statement to make war not only 
unthinkable but “materially impossible” (Schuman 1950). Peace in Europe was to 
be established through an economic integration following the old liberal claim 
that countries that trade with each other do not go to war with each other. The 
ideas about economic integration changed, however. In the 1960s and 1970s, a mix 
between negative and positive economic integration prevailed. The common 
agricultural policy was and remains a regime of regulated prices. European 
communities accommodated exemptions to competition policy in many state-
related and infrastructure sectors like transportation, energy, or communication. 
Efforts to remove obstacles against cross-border economic activities coexisted 
with efforts to harmonize social conditions. Only in the course of the 1980s a 
decisive move was made to advance cross-border liberalization even at the 
expense of transnational harmonization. The move to complete the internal 
market by 1992 marked the breakthrough of the new era of deregulation based on 
claims of economic efficiency (Cecchini et al. 1988).  
The course taken after the collapse of the Soviet Union and German unification 
reinforced the move towards a neoliberal integration path. The Maastricht Treaty 
codified the economic and monetary union based on austerity ideas. For the first 
time in history, countries committed to a general debt ceiling of 60 per cent of 
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GDP, a yearly maximum deficit of 3 per cent and low inflation rates as common 
goals. Even if the enforcement mechanisms were weak, the general orientation of 
macroeconomic policy making followed a clear supply side, austerity and financial 
stability agenda (Stützle 2014). Thus, long before the euro crisis, the EU 
consolidated a neoliberal integration path. The cross-border transfers available to 
meet the structural adjustments were lowered in the 1990s compared to the single 
market era. Eastern Expansion was to be accomplished with less compensation 
rather than more as might have been expected given the lower social standards 
across the Eastern European accession states. The southern periphery also had to 
share the structural funds with many new claims from the East (Berg and 
Gehrmann 2004). But the stability of the common currency helped to lower the 
pains since the public sector had access to cheaper funding due to the mechanisms 
of monetary union. While this benefited the members of the Eurozone, primarily, 
the whole of the EU prospered in the course of the 2000s until the 2008 crash23.  
Even though, civil society and political parties such as Podemos and Syriza did 
protest and called for a fundamental rethink of underlying growth models, 
economic developments till the present day are most strongly influenced by ideas 
of supply-side economics. Responses and measurements that had to be taken by 
European governments included measures of privatization of state properties, a 
decrease in minimum wages as well as a strong tightening of welfare 
measurements in general. Saving and cutting government expenditure as 
promoted by neoclassical and neoliberal actors such as the IMF was promoted by 
the center-right as the only way out, rather than Keynesian ideas based on deficit 
spending and international efforts to balance accounts (Blyth 2013).  
The state nevertheless remains an important economic actor that can 
influence economic development in numerous ways. Unsurprisingly, the role of 
the state in economic governance is at the center of controversies and central to 
new European integration ideas. The following documents of pro-European 
integration think tanks were identified because they contain conceptual work 
regarding economic integration that seem to differ from prevailing ideas.  
Table 11: European public interest economy 
Think tank Number of relevant publications 
European Alternatives 4 
EuropaNova 3 
Todiktio 1 
Project for a Democratic Union 1 
Friends of Europe 0 
Total 9 
Source: Own compilation 
  
                                                 
23  Statista, Wachstum des realen Bruttoinlandsprodukts (BIP) in der Europäischen Union und der 
Euro-Zone von 2003 bis 2013 (gegenüber dem Vorjahr). (Growth of real gross domestic product in 
the EU and Euro-Zone from 2003 to 2013 (compared to previous year). 
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European Alternatives again stands out in terms of publications that contain 
conceptual concerns in the field of economic integration and policy. The think 
tank does not publish too much that can be easily categorized as “economic” 
because the organization challenges the disconnection of economics from other 
social or political dimensions (interview one and personal communication). 
Regarding economic issues, European Alternatives can therefore be considered to 
radically challenge the status quo. It identifies the need for a new social model as 
a consequence of the interlinkage of member state economies. This is based on the 
concept of universal social rights amongst European citizens, as discussed 
previously. In order to be implemented, European Alternatives demands the EU to 
become “the guardian of basic social rights” (European Alternatives 2014, p. 41). 
Social protection is regarded as “an investment for society rather than a 
hindrance to growth” (ibid.). It follows that economic growth should be subsumed 
to social protection and not the other way around.  
In another document, European Alternatives features a strong statement 
regarding the failure of traditional economic integration and predominantly 
neoliberal economic policy perspectives in the EU. The Manifesto of the Appalled 
Economists (2010) claims to debunk various myth like the efficiency of financial 
markets, the need to lower public deficits to lower the burden of next generations, 
austerity credos like the need to cut spending to lower public debt and the causal 
relationship between public spending and increasing debt, or the need to reinsure 
financial markets in order to procure sound public finance. The document displays 
a clear distance to prevailing ideas:  
“Europe has been built for three decades on a technocratic basis which has 
excluded populations from economic policy debates. The neoliberal doctrine, 
which rests on the now indefensible assumption of the efficiency of financial 
markets, should be abandoned.” (p.31) 
And a new understanding combines negative and positive dimensions of economic 
policy making: 
“We must reopen the space of possible policies and discuss alternative and 
consistent proposals that constrain the power of finance and organize the 
‘harmonisation while the improvement is being maintained’ of European 
economic and social systems (art. 151 of the Lisbon Treaty). This requires the 
pooling of substantial budgetary resources, which would be collected from the 
development of a highly downward redistributive taxation in Europe ...”(ibid.) 
In “Eurocrisis calls for a new politics fit for the age” these ideas become connected 
to concrete forms of democratic control over the economic development in 
Europe. By critically reflecting upon the political events in the midst of the euro 
crisis, European Alternatives puts forward a cost-by-cause logic in arguing for 
higher citizens’ control. European citizens did not cause the debts banks took on, 
nor did German taxpayers cause the Greek sovereign debt crisis. From these 
observations, they deduce the need for a higher “democratic control over the 
shape of the economy” (2011). Due to the interconnectivity of national economies 
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in Europe, they dismiss the idea of higher control on national levels and see 
European economic governance as favorable. These ideas become operationalized 
through a “citizens’ agora” as a specific deliberation process in which 
considerations on a citizens’ level (through conventions) shall ultimately be 
discussed in the European parliament. This is a clear bottom-up process. Similar to 
previous considerations, the need for democratic elements is stressed here and a 
“rethinking of the bases of democracy in Europe” is advocated. 
Different conceptions are presented by PDU, which stress the need for more 
sustainable economic systems in which the state need to take a more prominent 
role. By establishing a definition of what unsustainable growth means, they 
develop its antidote; “sustainable growth”. Besides, the environmental damage 
capitalism has brought about, PDU also identifies economic growth, as we know it, 
as a driver for social inequality and unrest that stands in contrast to ideas of 
trickle-down effects. In order to change that, the PDU sees a need for an “active 
government” which support a comprehensive welfare state “from cradle to grave” 
(2015) and fosters economic growth driven by small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) (ibid.). Yet, PDU remains rather vague on what that actually means and what 
the consequences of a more sustainable economic development would be so that 
“[The] EU can blossom as a world leader in a future-minded form of capitalism” 
(2015). This is due to the fact that PDU does not see its focus on developing policy 
proposals. Thus, they do not formulate concrete ideas on how the European 
economy should look like in the future (interview three). PDU rather sees it as 
their task to establish the general conditions on a European level to make 
meaningful democratic decisions on European economic questions such as 
economic inequality (ibid.). On one aspect PDU is very clear, however: Europe does 
have to assume common responsibility for debt. This would clearly mean a break 
with the present configuration and economic governance regime. 
In the publication by DIKTIO (Network for Reform in Greece and Europe) 
entitled, “After the Greek deal: Three dangers and three opportunities - why it is 
urgent to complete EMU”, we are presented with ways to navigate the dangers and 
opportunities in strengthening the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). This 
paper emphasizes the necessity for a “true economic union” to be in place, in 
order for the currency union to remain sustainable. It is suggested that the 
cooperation and coordination of all member countries is impeded by complacency, 
blame games, and a lack of strategic vision. Solutions to these challenges are 
suggested, such as a comprehensive policy response to the ongoing crisis in 
Europe, ‘smart’ reforms (i.e. changes to economic policy that lead to a ‘plausible 
growth path’), boosting investment, and stronger Franco-German cooperation.  
The responses proposed by DIKTIO appear not to address (directly) the global 
financial and economic factors that contributed to the current crisis of the EMU. 
As globalized economies increasingly deepen their interdependence, cooperation 
and coordination in the age of financialization needs to extend far beyond EU 
member states in order to tackle the toxicity of contemporary global financial 
crises. Thus, concepts on strengthening the EU’s capacity to manage the EMU, 
situated within the complexity of a globalized economy, will be vital. While 
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European Alternatives is explicit about the need to tame the power of financial 
markets, none of the organizations tackle the global dimensions. What do we find 
in the mainstream considerations? 
2.6 Mainstream analysis: European public interest economy 
In the report from Enderlein and Pisani-Ferry it is the member state (especially 
France and Germany) that shall act in order to overcome the crisis. Besides a 
European harmonization of economic areas to achieve predictability and to boost 
private investments (p. 4), means of deeper European integration processes are 
not seen as the ultimate measure to overcome the crisis. Enderlein and Pisani 
consequently refrain from discussions about European institutional 
configurations. Because public investment policies are regarded as a main driver 
of economic growth, however, both national and European investment plans are 
proposed by the authors. It is Germany, in particular, which is urged to increase 
its public investments in infrastructure, especially in times of such low interest 
rates (Glienicker Group). 
Again, Spinelli Group is closer to the terrain of the progressive integration 
think tanks. In terms of the economic policies, it calls for “an economic 
government of the fiscal union” (p. 15), which would take the present EU in a new 
direction. In direct reference to the new intergovernmental economic governance 
regime, the group wants to bring legislation back into the realm of the community 
mode of governance: “The Fundamental Law codifies in primary law the key 
elements of the recent Six-Pack and Two-Pack legislation which strengthened EU 
surveillance and supervision of the individual state economies” (ibid.). From a 
legal perspective, this would strengthen the status of the Six-Pack and Two-Pack 
(essentially the Maastricht criteria and the surveillance mechanism) legislation by 
way of providing additional legitimacy, but would not change the criteria 
employed in these treaties as such. However, new dimensions of fiscal solidarity 
and a sharing of sovereign debts in special situations are proposed by the authors 
as well. Spinelli Group thus aims at mediating between present economic 
paradigms and moves towards fiscal federalism. But Spinelli Group appears to still 
shy away from a clear commitment. Prevailing notions of fiscal autonomy and 
self-responsibility are still evoked in contrast to both PDU and European 
Alternatives. 
2.7 Transnational civic/public sphere 
The public sphere is generally regarded as the place in which citizens can, through 
communication, mediate their interests in order to reach non-violent agreements. 
Gerard Hauser defined it as “a discursive space in which individuals and groups 
associate to discuss matters of mutual interest and, where possible, to reach a 
common judgment about them” (Hauser 1999, p. 61). With the coffee house often 
described as the ideal institutionalization in which public discourse could emerge 
in the eighteenth century, the concept of the public sphere has changed drastically 
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in recent times. With new communication devices at hand, discursive spaces are 
no longer bound to national and linguistic restraints allowing conceptualizations 
of the public sphere - in transnational terms - to gain increasing prominence.  
Its relevance for the EU becomes apparent by taking the normative dimension 
of the concept of the public sphere into account. Regarded as the space in which 
public opinion emerges, the public sphere is seen as the pillar in society in which 
citizens (especially in mass states) can make their voices heard and enforce 
control over his or her political representatives.  
Scholars, therefore, argue that the EU’s democratic deficit could indeed be 
counteracted through the discursive engagement of European citizens in European 
legislations. Transnational public discussion could form a European public sphere 
in which public opinion not only influences decision-making on the European 
level, but also functions as a critical reflection and control mechanism for 
European politics. At the same time, there is considerable debate over the 
feasibility of a European public sphere (compare Risse 2010). Scholars have argued 
that it still does not and cannot exist due to limits of language and media, for 
example. Others have pointed to the coexistence of national and transnational 
identities and public spheres. Yet, others have pointed to the general 
fragmentation of the public sphere due to social inequality, individualization and 
media configurations to which the European public just adds another dimension. 
In contrast to the traditional concern with the colonization of the public sphere by 
government and big business24, the contemporary debate in any case is focused on 
problems and limitations in terms of its democratic functions. 
The following documents have been identified on the websites of our think 
tank sample that develop conceptual ideas with regard to a transnational public 
sphere. 
Table 12: Transnational civic/public sphere 
Think tank Number of relevant publications 
European Alternatives 3 
Project for a Democratic Union 3 
EuropaNova 2 
Friends of Europe 0 
Todiktio 0 
Total 8 
Source: Own compilation 
“The public sphere ideally will be Europe’s real democratic glue and the source of 
its legitimation, above and beyond common history, values, and beliefs.” (PDU 
2013) 
  
                                                 
24  Habermas’ book on the structural transformation of the public sphere was originally published in 
1962, but has only be translated into English in 1989. 
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With regard to a prospective transnational European public sphere, PDU, in 
particular, provides clear insights on the European public sphere’s links to 
democratic deficits of the EU. PDU asks: “Is it enough to involve the European 
people in the institutional processes?” PDU denies such a limited procedural 
requirement and states instead “the EU has the responsibility to produce this 
public sphere where a European demos could display its richness and feel 
involved in the democratic process of the Union” (ibid.).  
In the article “The Need for a European Public Sphere”, PDU specifies what a 
European public sphere could actually look like. PDU conceptualizes a universal 
public sphere, which integrates both European national spheres, as well as 
European media projects that take a non-national, yet clearly European standpoint 
(as EurActive.de does, for example). 
As PDU also sees a need for an institutional rearrangement of the EU, it 
develops a concept of the public sphere that is tailored against the backdrop of the 
EU in which the European Parliament already has a much stronger voice. This is 
because PDU regards a European public sphere as ineffective. “Creating a European 
public sphere artificially, especially in the way the European Commission is trying 
to do, will never work. A public sphere comes into existence when there is an 
authority, which, through its decisions, affects my daily life and where I have the 
ability to influence such decisions” (interview three). 
This explains why PDU’s conceptualization of the public sphere only 
materializes after the European institutions have a stronger role in politics. In this 
scenario, the media should focus more strongly on “deliberations in the European 
Institutions” (2013), and the European Parliament in particular. According to PDU, 
it shall communicate issues of all Europeans between the different nations and 
social groups in order to establish a communicative space in which the 
understanding for each other’s needs increases. Besides the promotion of 
research, insights and debates, the European public sphere shall remind European 
citizens of the reason why the EU has been established in the first place. This shall 
foster the engagement of citizens in European politics, thereby mitigating 
nationalistic tendencies in Europe. In order to achieve this, the common language 
barrier is addressed through a stronger focus on English as a secondary language 
in school. 
The absence of explicit concepts on a European public sphere by European 
Alternatives is explained by Milanese for two main reasons. First, he sees the 
traditional normative ideal concept of the public sphere by Habermas as 
problematic. With reference to Laclau and Mouffe, he criticizes the idea of a 
Habermasian public sphere for proceduralism and the absence of social struggle 
between antagonizing forces in society. Further, he criticized that a concept of the 
public sphere along Habermasian lines transcribes the ideal of a republic of highly 
educated intellectuals to other spheres of society such as politics and, thus, 
idealizes rationalism. Besides these conceptual problems, European Alternatives 
regards the existing European public sphere as quite advanced: 
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“If you doubt that the European public sphere exists, go to any café or bar 
anywhere in Europe you like and ask the people about the Greek debt crisis or the 
Brexit, for that matter, and everybody’s got an opinion. And if this is not the 
European public sphere, what is?” (interview one) 
Here, we find conceptual disagreement with PDU, which in the interview argued 
that a European-wide discussion of events such as the Brexit or the Greek debt 
crisis is not an indication of a European public sphere. Rather, these are identified 
as national discourses which are different from each other. 
However, Milanese of European Alternatives observes the absence of a 
communicative power at the European level and, alongside the lack of strength to 
hold decision makers accountable through a European public sphere, he argues 
that such a recognition of limits has been essentialized by right-wing forces for 
different purposes: “Because there is no European public sphere, we can’t have a 
European democracy” (interview one). Instead of such a denial, European 
Alternatives negotiates power relations in society and relates these to the public 
sphere.  
Due to these reasons, we do not find concepts of a public sphere as such, but 
advocacy for a stronger involvement of journalists and civil society to overcome 
problems of intransparency and despotism in Europe. One problem European 
Alternatives identifies is the lack of information around deportation centers in 
Europe, for example. By calling for better access to detention centers by 
journalists and NGOs, European Alternative aims at strengthening the function of 
the media as a controlling mechanism, advancing the idea of the media as a fourth 
estate in the division of political power to the European level. Against the 
backdrop of a thorough analysis of the Italian media landscape and its strong 
monopolization by Berlusconi, European Alternatives calls for a “Europe-wide 
response” in order to save and guarantee freedom of the press in general, and to 
remove impediments in light of positive developments in Eastern Europe in 
particular. However, although the public sphere is advocated strongly, new 
concepts are not well explained in the case of European Alternatives. European 
Alternatives did help to establish a sense of Commission responsibility in this area 
backed by the European treaties, but this we learned in private communication 
(comment of Niccolo Milanese on our draft report), not from the website’s 
publications. 
Moreover, according to European Alternative’s Niccolo Milanese they see the 
“Theatrical and artistic action of European Alternatives” as a core activity in order 
to establish European spaces in which individuals come together to reflect upon 
Europe. European Alternatives thus conceptualizes a European public sphere from 
below, dedicated to addressing pressing concerns like migrant rights and 
violations of freedom of the press.  
EuropaNova instead has focused on dimensions of participatory democracy. 
The crisis of Europe’s regime of representative democracy is closely linked to the 
lack of a common European civic sphere. The European public sphere, therefore, 
has remained a sphere of experts (EuropaNova 2008, p. 43). EuropaNova demands a 
strengthening of complementary and more systematic forms of civic dialogue. The 
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document appears to be quite close to the design of the European Civic Forum, 
which was founded in 2005 to improve NGO participation. The concomitant 
demand of EuropaNova (2008, p. 44) for a European association statute no longer 
appears to be a part of the agenda to improve the European civic sphere. 
In summary, we seem to find complementary notions of a need for a stronger 
transnational public sphere to be organized “from above” (PDU), “from below” 
(European Alternatives) and by way of better integration of NGOs (EuropaNova). It 
appears to be common understanding of the three organizations that a European 
public sphere largely limited to elites and experts will not be a sufficient basis to 
support European democratic development. 
2.8 Mainstream analysis: Transnational civic/public sphere 
In the case of the conceptual work we can keep the comparison of think tank 
output to mainstream documents short since none of the documents included in 
the report considers the issue of the European civic/public sphere. This is 
surprising since integrating civil society has been such a strong emphasis of the 
Commission in response to the legitimacy crisis since the 1980s. After the “no 
vote” against the constitution in France and the Netherlands, additional money 
was provided to fund European political party foundations. At this point it was 
recognized that civil society participation as such does not necessarily lead to the 
strengthening of pro-European attitudes (Gagatek and van Hecke 2014). The crisis 
of the EU has not led to a larger discussion of the dilemmas of the (limited and 
fragmented) European public sphere. Efforts to increase participatory and 
representative European democracy certainly continue to suffer from a lack of 
both consideration and means offered to pursue an increasing European public 
sphere. 
2.9 Europe as central power in global political economy 
The contradiction between Europe’s position in the global economy and its 
political role has been at the center of European debates for a long time; 
economically a giant, politically a dwarf. Europe was sandwiched by the two 
military superpowers in the cold war constellation. Since most EU members are 
NATO members as well, Europe was at the same time a part of the U.S.-led side in 
the confrontation. Since France and the UK gained their own status as nuclear 
powers after the war (unlike Germany), there was limited interest in developing a 
common foreign policy position, which would after all have meant sharing 
nuclear power with the former enemy villain. Europe’s nation states were torn 
between the need for cooperation to gain strength vis-à-vis both Russia and the 
United States, and limited inclinations to share military and other foreign policy 
powers. Only with regard to international trade, the European Commission was 
put in charge of international negotiations and treaties.  
The feeble foreign policy position at the same time has been considered an 
advantage since Europe could not rely on military power. The experience of 
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negotiated orders internally guided Europeans to a certain extent to search for 
alternative solutions in the global context as well. The 2012 peace Nobel Prize was 
awarded to the EU in recognition of its contribution to reconciliation between 
previously bellicose nations (like Germany and France) and to peaceful and 
fraternal coexistence of nations.  
The collapse of the Soviet Union changed the global constellation dramatically, 
and opened both new spaces and needs for common European foreign policy. The 
Maastricht treaty integrated the Common Foreign and Security Policy to the 
Community method and established the office of a high official in this area. But 
the wars in Iraq displayed the deep division with some countries following the call 
of the United States (notably UK and Eastern European member states) while 
others refrained from joining the invasion (notably Germany and France). Similar 
divisions characterize the Ukraine and Syria conflicts. What were the implications 
of the global financial crisis with regard to the understanding of the role of the EU 
in the global political economy and polity? There has not been much work at all in 
this area in the five think tanks under investigation. Most of their work is 
targeting the European domestic situation. Work by European Alternatives on 
open border conceptions of citizenship and the promotion of social cooperation 
across borders could be considered to belong to the foreign policy field,25 but has 
not been translated into foreign policy perspectives of the EU so far. Only PDU in 
fact has invested time and energy on conceptual development in the field of 
foreign policy so defined. 
Table 13: Europe as central power in global affairs 
Think tank Number of relevant publications 
Project for a Democratic Union 1 
EuropaNova 0 
Friends of Europe 0 
European Alternatives 0 
Todiktio 0 
Total 1 
Source: Own compilation 
PDU’s core idea of a successful union refers to common debt and common foreign 
policy. Thus, it is obvious that PDU develops comprehensive ideas in this area. The 
statement of principles’ paragraphs five and six unequivocally call for a 
centralization of authority in the field of foreign policy: 
1. Some competences – such as foreign affairs, the armed services, and the 
common currency – which are now vested in the European Commission, the 
European Council, the Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
                                                 
25  Compare work on Ukraine: https://euroalter.com/2014/ukraine-a-struggle-for-the-rights-of-all-
europeans, on Egypt: https://euroalter.com/2013/young-egyptians-are-reminding-us-what-dem 
ocracy-means-2, and on Turkey: https://euroalter.com/2013/solidarity-with-the-uprisings-in-
turkey, as well as the idea of transnational dialogues: https://transnationaldialogues.eu, for 
example (all links were retrieved on 2nd November 2016). 
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Security Policy, the European Parliament, and member states, will 
henceforth be the sole preserve of the Union government. Other powers will 
be returned to national and regional level, including the setting of the 
minimum wage. 
2. The Union should have at its command a single European army, with the 
monopoly of external force employment. 
PDU thus infers that the EU replaces nation state membership in NATO. Apart from 
the clear statement of the need to overcome the divisions within Europe with 
regard to many foreign policy issues, PDU does not offer further consideration 
with regard to the policy orientation. 
2.10 Mainstream analysis: Europe as central power in global political 
economy 
When it comes to conceptions of the future of the EU’s role in global affairs, 
Glienicker Group offers many insights, reminding us that “Europe ought to be able 
to defend her common interests effectively [and shall] pursue a joint strategy on 
global trade and finance legislation“ (2013). Concomitantly, the group demands 
that the EU should attain a common seat in international economic organizations 
such as the IMF and the World Bank (Glienicker Group). China is referred to as the 
up-and-coming power, while the U.S. is seen in decline. The group is also calling 
for an independent strategy in outer space. 
The Five Presidents’ Report also supports such a unification of political 
representation internationally, stating that the “fragmented voice means the EU is 
punching below its political and economic weight [. . .]. This is particularly true in 
the case of the IMF” (2015, p. 17). Interestingly, although politics of defence and 
security are usually seen as core areas of national legislation, the survey of the 
Friedrich Ebert Foundation shows that a Europeanization of foreign defence and 
security policies has the highest popularity of six policy areas the participants 
responded to. Similarly, a Europeanization of the taxation of international 
enterprises in Europe shows equally strong support (2015, p. 16). 
Both in PDU’s work and in the mainstream documents, however, we only find 
an emphasis on a stronger external role of the EU in terms of common economic 
and security interests. Beyond global competition with major economic actors, the 
mainstream discourse exhibits very little in terms of exploring the EU’s global 
role and vision. 
2.11 Conclusion of conceptual development in pro-European think tanks 
We have witnessed considerable efforts to develop ideas about an expanded 
European citizenship, though legal and political rights were stronger on the 
horizon of participating think tanks than social rights. In this area, the 
mainstream flexicurity model can also be observed in the group of pro-European 
think tanks. A notable difference between the conceptual work of pro-European 
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think tanks and EU institution mainstream is visible in the area of economic 
policy. A European public interest economy is considered to replace the still 
dominant focus on growth and competitiveness. In some ways, this finding 
qualifies the limited notion of social citizenship, though the conceptual work with 
regard to the European public interest economy remains vague. Considerable 
effort can be observed with regard to the advance of transnational democracy, 
which goes clearly beyond the EU institution mainstream except for the Spinelli 
Group, which shares the concern for a greater role of the European Parliament. 
Again, the operationalization remains relatively vague, as there is no 
consideration for the role of European political parties, for example. In the area of 
the European civic/public sphere, the group of think tanks differs whether it 
needs to be developed from above, from below, or by way of better integration of 
NGOs. But the link between a more fully developed public sphere and European 
democracy is clearly understood. In contrast, the mainstream documents included 
in this study do not waste time on Europe’s civic/public sphere. The relationship is 
reversed with regard to the fifth and final conceptual efforts we detected: Europe’s 
role in global affairs. While only PDU spends time to consider a common foreign 
defence framework, the EU mainstream documents display a strong focus on 
foreign economic and security policy efforts. 
 
 
 
3 Conceptual work in debating platforms 
In this section we will establish if and to what extent new conceptual efforts 
reverberate in pro-European integration debating platforms with the think tanks 
analyzed above; included in this analysis are Open Europe, Eutopia, FutureLab 
Europe, Political Critique and Publixphere. To recap, the debating platforms 
represent pro-European commentary and range in format from collaborative 
weblogs to journal type entries, as well as span geographically across Europe26. 
Our five debating platforms have produced a total of 2,133 documents between 
2011 and 2016. 
We associated concepts and documents of the platforms via a multilevel 
process of filtering documents considered relevant for our purposes, namely 
identifying documents that reflect the conceptual innovations detected in the 
realm of the pro-Europeanan think tanks: Expanded European citizenship 
(universal and inviolable citizenship/resident rights); transnational 
democracy/institutional primacy of Europe; European public interest 
economy/economic democracy; and transnational civic/public sphere. There is 
only one publication on the conceptual dimension “Europe as central power in 
global political economy”. Interestingly, the larger theme was also not evident in 
the debating platform discussions. 
  
                                                 
26  For further details on each of the debating platforms, please refer above to page 14. 
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In our work we proceeded as follows: 
• Exclusion of all documents that are superficially connected with EU affairs. 
• Identification of documents that by n-gram-extraction or presence of 
keywords exhibited the respective concept (e.g. “citizenship” for expanded 
European citizenship). 
• Identification of documents out of the previous set, which dealt topically 
with the subjects (e.g. European citizenship/transnational democracy, 
financial sector, economic policy) and relationally by distancing from 
mainstream thinking on these topics (stressing, for example, the demands 
for, or conditions of deep democratization, civil interaction or the 
empowerment of public sphere in the economy). 
• We excluded all documents that limited their discussion to factual political 
decisions, acts, events (as in reporting), as well as the great number 
advocating European common values, historical memory and cultural 
identity. Although they may be valuable as a basis of further European 
integration, they did not add to a progressive conceptualization that 
overcomes the current crisis of European integration. 
There are other concepts of widespread public concern like climate protection, 
sustainable development and gender equality, which were considered for 
conceptual innovation. Surprisingly, there was little evidence for this in this 
selection of pro-European think tanks and debating platforms. 
The following tables display the platform publications according to the conceptual 
area described previously:  
Table 14: Total number of publications per thematic field 
Thematic field Number of publications 
Transnational civic/public sphere 36 
Transnational democracy/institutional primacy of Europe 28 
European public interest economy/economic democracy 25 
Universal and inviolable citizenship/resident rights (expanded 
European citizenship) 
7 
Source: Own compilation 
The following tables show the contributions of each individual platform according 
to the conceptual area. 
Table 15: Number of articles according to thematic fields by Eutopia 
Thematic field Number of publications 
Transnational democracy/institutional primacy of Europe 8 
European public interest economy/economic democracy 6 
Transnational civic/public sphere 3 
Source: Own compilation 
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Table 16: Number of articles according to thematic fields by FutureLab Europe 
Thematic field Number of publications 
Transnational civic/public sphere 4 
Transnational democracy/institutional primacy of Europe 2 
Source: Own compilation 
Table 17: Number of articles according to thematic fields by OneEurope 
Thematic field Number of publications 
Transnational civic/public sphere 14 
Transnational democracy/institutional primacy of Europe 12 
European public interest economy/economic democracy 8 
Universal and inviolable citizenship/resident rights (expanded 
European citizenship) 
4 
Source: Own compilation 
Table 18: Number of articles according to thematic fields by Publixphere 
Thematic field Number of publications 
Transnational democracy/institutional primacy of Europe 4 
European public interest economy/economic democracy 2 
Transnational civic/public sphere 1 
Universal and inviolable citizenship/resident rights (expanded 
European citizenship) 
1 
Source: Own compilation 
Table 19: Number of articles according to thematic fields by Political Critique 
Thematic field Number of publications 
Transnational democracy/institutional primacy of Europe 12 
European public interest economy/economic democracy 10 
Transnational civic/public sphere 3 
Universal and inviolable citizenship/resident rights (expanded 
European citizenship) 
2 
Source: Own compilation 
Most documents we found were written by Open Europe and Political Critique. 
Unlike the conceptual documents of the think tanks, we found few contributions 
in the area of expanded European citizenship. The focus is strongest on 
transnational democracy and public sphere followed by European public interest 
economy.  
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3.1 Limited interest in expanded European citizenship 
Table 20: Articles on expanded European citizenship 
Debate platform Article title 
OneEurope Demanding the creation of a new State - Could this 
shake up one of the pillars of the EU? 
OneEurope European citizenship 
OneEurope Freedom of Movement as a Human Right 
OneEurope One Europe, One Citizenship 
OneEurope Harmonization of Salaries and Pensions within the 
Eurozone 
Publixphere Democracy under pressure in Europe –  proposal 
for a solution 
Political Critique Rainbow Pride 2016: manifestation against 
illiberalism in Slovakia 
Political Critique What Europe does Ukraine need? 
Source: Own compilation 
The online magazines are surprisingly quiet in the area of expanded European 
citizenship. On two (Eutopia and FutureLab) of the five platforms we could not find 
any contributions that were considered close to the notions of expanded European 
citizenship discussed in section 2.1. Only OneEurope, with five articles, displays a 
somewhat stronger interest in this area. 
OneEurope features a reflection on European citizenship as it has historically 
evolved, mostly on the European Court of Justice’s activities. One author discusses 
freedom of movement as a human right, sharing experiences of Eastern Europeans 
during the time when they were excluded from travelling after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Another contribution discusses conflicting perspectives of European 
identity and citizenship – complementary or problematically undermining 
national identity – to be in favor of changing (Europeanizing) citizenship as 
enrichment. Yet another suggests that Europe’s democracy is undermined if 
citizens do not share the same rights; recently increasing attacks on free 
movement and travel within the EU are regarded as seeds for destruction. Another 
danger is seen in attempts to use European citizen initiatives to support regional 
secession (of Catalans in this case), since they divert attention from the task of 
expanding European citizenship by way of reinforcing domestic conflict lines. In 
“European Citizenship: an appropriate citizenship or a simple breath of air?” it 
becomes clear that the contribution by OneEurope strongly considers a lack of 
specification of European citizenship rights and duties in the treaties. 
OneEurope also features a publication titled “Harmonization of Salaries and 
Pensions within the Eurozone”; as described previously, it links the goal of 
harmonization to the inequality of minimum incomes in different countries (e.g. 
Greeks on minimum wages now receive 600 Euros per month - 700 before the 
crisis - compared to 1,200 Euros per month in Ireland, although prices for 
essential consumer goods are comparable). Thus, here we can detect a notion of 
social citizenship aiming at the reduction of inequality across countries.  
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Publixsphere re-published a contribution to a web-magazine in the Young 
European Federalist dealing with alleged violations of European principles in the 
East. The article identifies a limit of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
“The big flaw of the Charter is, however, that it only applies to member states 
‘when they are implementing Union law’. The exact interpretation of this 
restriction is subject to debate among lawyers. However, the Charter does not 
apply to purely national acts of member state government bodies” (Krappitz, 
2016). The author aims at reinforcing the rights of citizens to enforce their rights 
in front of the European Court of Justice. 
Political Critique in turn features a claim for full-fledged European 
citizenship as a key to a functioning international democracy. Similar to the 
conceptual work discovered at the think tank sites we also find support for LGBT 
rights. 
We thus can observe overlap with the conceptual work discussed in section 
2.1: Authors’ pick up the thread of migrant and minority rights, and sometimes 
even develop ideas that go further than the conceptual work we examined 
previously (e.g. specifying the legal reform requirements with regard to the 
charter of fundamental rights). There is very limited discussion of social 
citizenship dimensions of expanded European citizenship, which is not surprising 
given the limited attention to this in the conceptual work. 
Many contributions on the debating platforms, of course, touch on citizenship 
ideas in one way or the other (e.g. regarding minority rights in a specific country 
or migration problems in certain spaces, is commonly touched upon). However, 
relatively clear discussions about the (necessary or possible) expansion of 
European citizenship are far from common in the pro-European discussions. Thus, 
there is clearly room for clarification of agendas in the area of European 
citizenship. 
Altogether we can observe a concern with expanded citizenship rights for 
migrants, and in one case, the reflection of a transnational social citizenship 
perspective. The focus on legal limitations in the EU and reform ideas with regard 
to the charter of fundamental rights take us beyond the work done by the think 
tanks we discussed in section 2.1. But in general it is quite obvious that debating 
platforms express fears and dangers with regard to citizenship rights, rather than 
promoting attempts to expand European citizenship perspectives. The small 
number of contributions discovered on the five platforms that relate to the 
conceptual work suggests there is a lot of room for a more focused debate in this 
area. 
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3.2 Significant interest in transnational democracy 
Table 21: Transnational democracy-related documents 
Platforms Number of documents 
OneEurope 13 
Political Critique 13 
Eutopia (ideas for Europe magazine) 10 
Publixphere 5 
FutureLab Europe 2 
Total 43 
Source: Own compilation 
Eutopia embraces the radicalization of EU discourse and the breakdown of so-
called consensus over the EU project as an opportunity to create political space for 
true contestation and a movement away from an elite-run body politic. During 
this time of upheaval in Europe, authors suggest that the distribution of wealth, 
power and privilege can be examined and reconfigured so that democracy can 
flourish. A new institutional architecture and system of decision-making 
processes for European governance is seen as necessary to increase citizen 
engagement, open up public discourse, and increase citizen control over EU rules 
and policies. EU solidarity is regarded as fundamental to the interests of all 
citizens in Europe and that the crisis the Syriza government faced is not isolated, 
and best addressed through cooperation with EU members. These conceptual 
details (opposing “elite governance”) resonate with European Alternative’s 
sentiments regarding deepening democracy and the inclusion of social 
movements and active citizenry as necessary ingredients for achieving 
transnational democracy.  
Beyond the binary pair of Euroscepticism and Euro-unionism we find 
statements on Eutopia that there is a ‘third way’ they call Euro-federalism. This 
call for a move toward a federal system echoes the Project of a Democratic Union’s 
statements. However, Eutopia authors appear to go one step further by invoking a 
Kantian perspective to argue that a ‘United Europe of States’ provides far more 
effective options than the binary pair and is most important in maintaining peace 
between nations. Authors describe how the political fault lines revealed in the 
European Union, from events such as the European parliamentary elections held 
on 25 May 2014 to Brexit, cannot be addressed by the ‘grand coalition’ of the 
European Council and European Parliament. Politics, they say, must be front and 
center in the decision-making process of the Eurozone, not the technocratic 
process that is currently in place, allowing a union of states to support 
supranational democracy, rather than derail it.  
Moreover, they describe how the politicization of EU politics has been 
emboldened by populist parties and that the EU’s complex intergovernmental and 
supranational structure is too abstract for citizens to engage and participate in 
(unlike national mechanisms). Yet, Eutopia notes that the fact the EU process has 
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become politicized with significant confrontation arising at the European level, is 
an achievement for democracy as it - through a republican perspective - 
illustrates a dynamic and open political process.  
FutureLab Europe suggests that the citizen and decision maker gap in the 
European Union needs to be closed in order to develop a truly European culture; 
participation by citizens is desperately needed. They also feel that participatory 
democracy in Europe could be enhanced by leveraging technology and 
complementing this with scaling-up instruments of direct democracy. This would 
be supported with emphasizing the need by EU member states to invest in 
education that promotes informed participation.  
Trust in European institutions is seen as another obstacle for European 
democracy and FutureLab suggests that corruption and transparency need to be 
addressed. Along similar lines to the narrative generated by European 
Alternatives, FutureLab Europe authors see current EU economic policy making as 
derisive to the development of a united and democratic EU. The integrity of EU 
citizenship should be upheld beyond all other matters. Moreover, the EU is 
described as an aspirational form of transnational democracy that must 
encapsulate a political community of equals.  
Alternatively, OneEurope publications encompass ideas around reframing the 
political-philosophical concept of nation-state democratic structures in order to 
support transnational democracy. Issues around European cohesion are often 
raised and solutions suggested using federalist notions. We again see 
interconnections with European Alternatives on conceptual characteristics 
regarding democratic deficits and resolutions involving the “deepening” of 
democracy, thinking globally, while acting locally, as well as endorsement of the 
“The Citizens Manifesto”. OneEurope’s commentary on the Future of Europe Group 
report, released on September 17, 2012, describes notions of transnational 
democracy in support of a political union. Political union would help to advance 
EU foreign policy and improve representation of EU members in international 
organizations. To support the integrity of a political union, veto of member states 
would need to be curtailed. EU member states would have to be willing to adapt 
and function collectively.  
Enhancing the representativeness of the EU to more aptly reflect civil society 
is often emphasized by OneEurope; specifically, increasing more direct forms of 
democracy in the decision-making process, such as utilizing internet technology. 
Yet, as acknowledged by Eutopia also, the concept of European citizenship is too 
abstract. European parliamentarians need to be more visible and transparent in 
order to successfully counter apathy toward EU politics and institutions. Once 
again, OneEurope draws interconnections with the concept of a transnational 
civic/public sphere in regards to importance of democratic instruments, such as 
the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI), to improve the democratic conditions and 
resolve deficits. Echoing Eutopia, a Kantian perspective is implied, in that to 
disregard a more representative EU exposes the Union to failure and the potential 
for pandering to nationalist rhetoric, possibly creating tensions between countries 
and the transition to violent conflicts. 
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Quite distinctly from the other discourse platforms, OneEurope draws 
interconnections between transnational democracy and the European public 
sphere (or transnational civic/public sphere), in truly fostering a European 
identity. Specifically, OneEurope sees the development of EU taxation as 
foundational for a European identity to materialize, as taxes create a more direct 
connection between people and authority; “Taxation with Representation”.  
OneEurope also describes a conceptual element that inhibits integration and 
transnational democracy from flourishing in the EU; that of the disfunction of the 
European Parliament and its substantial focus on market and trade-based 
economics, including general support of austerity measures. This resonates quite 
highly with almost all debating platforms and think tanks. However, very little is 
said amongst any of the think tanks and debating platforms on the economic and 
political global dynamics that influence EU transnational democracy, such as the 
2008 global economic crisis that, arguably, contributed to the ongoing Eurozone 
crisis.  
In regards to situations of crisis, Political Critique sees the current refugee 
crisis in Europe as an opportunity for transnational solidarity and fostering 
understanding for a post-national European community. Political Critique 
contributions see the refugee crisis as a chance for transformative action in 
building the capacity of the European community to absorb the movement of 
people, coupled with principles of fraternity for all, freedom and equality. The 
increasing strength of the right in Europe on issues like the refugee crisis is 
considered to be partly a result of the failures of the left in ignoring populist 
defences of national identity and a welfare state for “natives only”27. This aligns 
with Publixphere’s commentary on addressing the creditor-debtor relationship 
that the EU has imposed with repercussions to national social security, which the 
right-wing forces have effectively absorbed into their agendas. However, Political 
Critique writing sees a major factor contributing to populist parties absorbing 
their social agenda due to the left’s close alignment to neoliberal inclinations.  
Similarly to Publixphere, Political Critique suggests that the left should focus 
on endorsing European social protection of national welfare states - against the 
ills of globalization - by preparing the public for ideas regarding the transfer of 
large elements of economic sovereignty to supranational institutions. An 
alternative form of patriotism beyond the nation state is considered necessary, 
which integrates a defence of pluralism and diversity and the guarantee of social 
security and social justice. Processes of cultural integration are also deemed 
necessary, but controls over immigration will inevitably be part of this. Processes 
of democratization in Europe features prominently in much of Political Critiques 
posts and they show strong support for the Democracy in Europe Movement 
(DiEM25).28 DiEM25’s focus on transnational cooperation of movements across 
                                                 
27  http://politicalcritique.org/world/eu/2016/after-brexit-lessons-from-populists/ (retrieved on 
28th October 2016). 
28  This is true for the English website. It may be possible that Polical Critique’s Polish language 
website displays different orientations. 
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Europe in order to transcend national boundaries, aligns with much of Political 
Critique’s posts.  
At times, there appears to be a convergence of agendas where Political 
Critique, in one instance, posted DiEM25’s manifesto that promotes democratizing 
Europe through immediate measures, such as full transparency of decision-
making to longer-term goals like the creation of a Constitutional Assembly with 
“representatives elected on trans-national tickets”29. Political Critique’s echoing 
and (general) endorsement of DiEM25’s manifesto reflect sentiments shared by 
European Alternatives, particularly regarding issues over the power of economic 
interests and financial markets that dominate EU politics and addressing this with 
an influx of transnational democracy.  
Along a similar vein of criticism, Publixphere views the Troika as extremely 
unaccountable and opaque in its decision-making as it essentially disempowers 
national parliaments. It is suggested that the Troika should be replaced with a 
European Monetary Fund and that countries heavily impacted by the euro crisis 
undergo a balance between structural and consolidated reforms. In collaboration 
with the European Democracy Lab, a European Republic is described that brings 
political equality for all, guided by election justice, equal access to social rights 
and tax equity. They acknowledge that there are many challenges to resolve in 
order for such a project to take shape, in particular how voting would be 
conducted, consideration over territorial delineations, preservation over cultural 
diversity and whether or not a European constitution is needed.  
A single democratic government with a transnational system that ensures all 
citizens to receive social security is proclaimed as the way forward, rather than 
the creditor-debtor relationship that destroys the bonds between EU members. It 
is suggested that if this does not happen, populist and right-wing parties across 
Europe will continue to gain prominence and divisive actions against the EU 
project, such as Brexit, will result. For Publixphere, democracy and sovereignty 
need to be reconsidered beyond the nation state through a single European 
democratic government that has a separation of powers and a transnational ballot 
system. This could be seen as reflective of mainstream efforts described 
previously, specifically the Spinelli Group’s call for EP elections in addressing the 
gap between the elected and the electorate.  
The conceptual work discussed in section 2.1 is mirrored in the contributions 
to the debating platforms. We find a similar emphasis on anti-elitist conceptions 
of European governance, and clear notions of equality and citizenship rights as a 
basis of transnational democracy to be achieved. Clear limitations to democracy 
are identified that result from economic power, though this is not at the center of 
discussions. Cross references occur (from OneEurope to the Citizenship Manifesto 
of European Alternatives, for example), and links to European political movements 
(like DiEM25) are visible. But there are few ideas as to how to move toward a 
transnational democracy, and a surprising lack of reform proposals with regard to 
                                                 
29  http://politicalcritique.org/world/eu/2016/a-manifesto-for-democratising-europe/ (retrieved on 
28th October 2016). 
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European political parties, elections and European governance. OneEurope 
discussions overlap with the conceptual work on the transnational public sphere 
with a call for a “top-down” approach for common tax measures, seen as a 
prerequisite for a common identity by building bonds between citizens and 
European central authority. In general, ideas discussed remain vague and there 
appears to be a lack of common rallying points. 
There also appears to be very little conceptual work describing, and reacting 
to, the growing interconnections between the global political economy and 
European transnational democracy. Undoubtedly, the lines between our analysis 
with Europe as a central power in global political economy and transnational 
democracy overlap, however, for simplicity's sake, it is felt that if think tanks, 
debating platforms and the mainstream overlook this interconnection they will 
fail to elevate a contemporary discourse on issues of transnational democracy. 
This is not to say that efforts to strengthen and reform EU institutions are not 
necessary for the realization of a truly European transnational democracy, but 
that concurrent efforts are needed to counter global economic forces that impede 
deepening EU democracy.  
As so many of the contributors to this discourse focus attention on the 
adaptation of transnational democracy to the demands of economic interests, it is 
surprising that they typically do not take this analysis further by analyzing how 
elite actors impede democratic development (such as global lobby groups and 
networks); they also remain focused on European patterns of elite interaction and 
thus seem to ignore global dynamics. In other words, the conceptual work on 
European transnational democracy fails to address some of the macro factors that 
enable neoliberal economic hegemony and allied spoilers (such as financial elites) 
that undermine pan-European democratic aspirations. Otherwise, these efforts 
will arguably continue to result in an imported form of democracy, heavily 
defined by transnational industry and varieties of neoliberalism.  
The irony is that, despite acknowledging how traditional concepts of 
sovereignty are not conducive to a European transnational democracy, the 
conceptualization of a European transnational democracy is antiquated in the face 
of increasing globalized economic interests.  
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3.3 European public interest economy: marginal interest 
Table 22: Documents related to European public interest economy 
Platforms  Number of publications 
Political Critique 12 
OneEurope 8 
Eutopia (ideas for Europe magazine) 6 
Publixphere 2 
FutureLab Europe 0 
Total 28 
Source: Own compilation 
The discussion related to a European public interest economy can be specified in 
the following ways: to contribute to public welfare as encoded in human and 
democratic rights; to reliably move towards the goal of sustainable development 
and recognize the insufficiency of the market process to address public interest; to 
advance a democratization of economic, financial, monetary policy and economic 
process (including centralization and democratic organization on EU level); to 
support an economically active state, public investment and efforts to reduce 
unemployment; and to place limitations on the financial sector and multinational 
corporations to mitigate impacts on autonomous democratically constituted public 
realms. 
The conceptual element regarding public goods beyond the marketplace is 
mostly expressed by two documents. Jedrzei Malko, author of “Economics And Its 
Discontents”, republishes a chapter of his book with a political critique to unveil 
the seemingly neutral nature of money and market processes as an agent of 
social-power relations. Correspondingly, the markets are orthogonal and 
counterintuitive to democratic organization of the public realm. 
In the Eutopia article “The Transatlantic Free Trade Negotiation: The Zombie 
Agreement” free trade is depicted as an imaginary panacea and the dominance of 
trade and the free market perspective leads to the evaporation of higher political 
aims. Moreover, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is 
assessed as disempowering national and the European parliament, as it upholds 
rights for corporations and punishes governments through corporate tribunals if 
regulations are deemed as hurting profits. It is concluded that free trade should be 
further developed as a strategy to attaining economic sustainability, while 
guaranteeing human rights. Along rights-based arguments, Eutopia’s article “The 
EU Year of the Citizens: What Does It Mean For The Citizens?” describes the 
interconnections between civic activities and high standard social welfare, and 
that social and economic exclusion and economic inequality endanger the 
formation of a vibrant civic sphere.  
The next conceptual element drawn from these publications revolves around 
democratization processes of the economy, as well as financial and monetary 
policy. In the article “A European Ministry of Finance?” connections are made to 
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Sarkozy's idea of creating a European ministry of finance. Proposals are suggested 
that are in line with the established structures of the EU, but makes criticisms on 
the autonomy of central banks and, in particular, the European Central Bank (ECB). 
It is suggested that by developing a European ministry of finance that the ECB 
would come under democratic control, if only formally.  
Publixphere’s articles “Bullmann (SPD): Troika - Bürokratenherrschaft ohne 
Verantwortung” and “De Masi (Linke): Die Troika ist Gift für Europa” criticize the 
political irresponsibility of the Troika as symptomatic in not having democratic 
oversight. It is suggested that the European parliament shall gain authority over 
finance reform of member countries and management of reform programs. If not 
done so, it is argued, the potential disintegration of the EU will materialize, riding 
the anti-EU momentum of national elections in several member countries. These 
articles suggest that the Troika’s policy of compulsory austerity is responsible for 
weak economic growth in the EU countries, and that the only alternative is 
democratization of economic decision-making and the prioritization of public 
welfare. 
In reference to the Eutopia article “Alternatives to Atlantic trade agreements: 
Ethical trade and sovereign democracy” Christian Felber states that the TTIP trade 
deal will dominate democratic decision processes, but acknowledges that there is 
little alternative to expanding and organizing international trade. Of course, 
profit-motivated objectives of this form of trade should aspire to higher political 
aims, which contribute to human development and ecological sustainability.  
OneEurope’s “European Young Trade Unionists: ‘We are not a Lost Generation’” 
article describes a coalition of young trade unionists who demand investments in 
quality jobs and public services. Moreover, this article highlights their demand for 
institutional efforts toward financial equalization between the member states in 
order to tackle the crisis of youth unemployment in the EU. The main argument of 
the article is that the democratization of economic decision-making and 
procedures will strengthen European citizen rights. 
Ideas on developing an EU expert group that would set specific limits to risky 
financial transactions by banks have been articulated in the article, “Restraining 
the Dominant Financial Sector in the E.U.” Although it is acknowledged that to 
outline the details of how this group operates is beyond the scope of the article, 
this modest proposal is seen as having only a slight chance of being passed. The 
author criticizes the convoluted and undemocratic decision-making process by the 
EU, and demands the democratization of EU structures. Specifically, the article 
suggests that strengthening the position of the EU parliament is necessary as well 
as the abolition of veto rights of the European national governments.  
In the article “Tax-Havens - Europe′s Hell?”, OneEurope’s Christos Mouzeviris 
describes how tax havens need to be controlled as they are largely eviscerating 
the coffers of public service provision. As a hive for tax haven, Christos sees tax 
evasion as a national business model promoted by the EU. He suggests stronger 
regulations for multinationals and the banking sector (who are responsible for the 
crisis). 
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Although ideas about a different European economic space, namely one 
dedicated to the public interest rather than to private gain, are present in the 
discussions of debating platforms, the number of articles dedicated to the various 
conceptual dimensions of interest is limited. Restraining the financial sector, 
restraining post-democratic austerity governance and advancing a different 
economic policy agenda in favor of public sector investment and employment are 
featured. But there are not many links to progressive economic actors and 
struggles (e.g. trade unions, or links to programmatic discussions of progressive 
economists like the organized effort of the Euro-Memo group). While there clearly 
is no support for growth and competitiveness agendas, there is also not much 
clarity about alternatives to be discussed, let alone pursued. 
3.4 Varied perspectives on transnational civic/public sphere 
Table 23: Documents related to transnational civic/public sphere 
Debate platform  Number of articles 
Eutopia (ideas for Europe magazine) 1 
FutureLab Europe 4 
OneEurope 11 
Publixphere 1 
Total 17 
Source: Own compilation 
Eutopia‘s Philippe Aigrain proposes that the transnational public sphere is 
integral to developing alternatives to the EU’s evolution centered on “war-like 
economic competition”30. Aigrain suggests that EU discourse is significantly 
focused on economics, largely influenced by small groups of individuals, and 
ignores ecological reform, as well as the potential for technology to provide a 
bridge between citizens and policy debate. This largely resonates with Jørn 
Loftager’s chapter “Deliberative Democracy and Political Ideology: Social 
Liberalism vs. Neoliberalism” in the book “The Democratic Public Sphere”, which 
articulates the tensions over competing narratives against the overwhelming tide 
of market-based sentiment.31  
Beyond this, Aigrain warns against too much hope for technocratic fixes. He 
sees the development of a “digital sphere” not only useful in opening up 
opportunities for collaboration - through shared interests - on alternative 
pathways for EU development, but also considers it as a potential instrument of 
economically-driven elite forces. With this in mind, a general sentiment by 
Aigrain and fellow authors on Eutopia is that serious effort is needed to improve 
the relationship between citizens and politics through this space, both online and 
                                                 
30  http://www.eutopiamagazinearchive.eu/en/philippe-aigrain/issue/can-bottom-actions-citizens-
regenerate-democracy-europe.html (retrieved on 28th October 2016). 
31  http://www.unipress.dk/udgivelser/d/democratic-public-sphere,-the/ (retrieved on 28th October 
2016). 
 
 56 
offline. Such offline efforts are supported by Eutopia, in collaboration with 
European Alternatives, in events such as Transeuropa; a festival of politics, culture 
and art, providing a temporary space for exchange in various parts of Europe 
where people can find common interests and co-create ideas on culture, equality 
and democracy beyond state confines.  
Much of FutureLab Europe’s work under this category revolves around 
promoting and engaging in events with citizens across Europe. In “Self-organised 
European Citizens’ Initiative against TTIP. Has the EU heard its citizens’ voices?”, 
Simona Pronckute describes the effectiveness of, essentially, a transnational 
public sphere, specifically the self-organized European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) 
against TTIP. Pronckute postulates whether or not the EU has “heard its citizens’ 
voices” in regards to the TTIP negotiations and that bureaucratic proceduralism 
has impeded the ability for representatives of ECI to engage in this process. 
Despite these setbacks, she highlights that ECI has placed a spotlight on European 
trade negotiations by raising public awareness and could be considered “one of 
the most successful citizens’ campaigns” in the European public sphere.32 As 
mentioned previously, FutureLab Europe complements these viewpoints with 
public events across Europe, such as focusing on ways to build trust in the 
European public sphere for the European project, specifically around European 
identity, equal opportunities and democratic values. They also promote the use of 
educational programmes throughout Europe to actively engage youth to spread 
awareness on the importance of the European Union.  
OneEurope’s Bella Felix, in what is arguably one of the more unique 
suggestions contributing to the concept of a transnational civic/public sphere in 
Europe, outlines the Netherlands’ Poldermodel (OneEurope, 2015); a system of 
continuous political cooperation and dialogue between citizens and the state in 
tackling the constant threat of flooding. According to Felix, throughout Dutch 
history - due to the Poldermodel - there has never been a majority held by a 
single party and, as a result, cooperation has been a necessity. The Netherlands’ 
relatively open society steeped in a “culture of conversation” represents a model 
that, in Felix’s estimation, could be replicated throughout Europe to shorten the 
‘distance’ between citizens and EU politicians. However, Felix appears to overlook 
what the common ‘threat’ to the EU is that all parties in Europe would feel 
compelled to address by embracing a cooperative mechanism like the 
Poldermodel.  
In the book “The Democratic Public Sphere”, Mark E. Warren questions whether 
public spheres can be made more democratic when relying heavily on 
institutional innovation (2016). Along these lines, no doubt, a common concern for 
pro-European integration actors is the development of a transnational European 
public sphere where EU politicians engage with citizens across Europe more 
effectively in order to mitigate anti-integration sentiment. However, what 
institutional arrangement would foster the imperative that compels anti-
                                                 
32  http://www.FutureLabeurope.eu/blog/self-organised-european-citizens-initiative-against-ttip-
has-the-eu-heard-its-citizens-voices/ (retrieved on 28th October 2016). 
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European groups to cooperate with pro-European actors and embrace a 
Poldermodel?33 
In a more conventional, yet critical addition, Kwinten Lambrecht proposes how 
ineffectual digital media has been in expanding a transnational public sphere, in 
what he calls the “Online Brussels Bubble”. According to Lambrecht, in what could 
be described as an echo chamber, he suggests that myopic conditions are evident 
in online EU dialogue. He states that what is likely needed to bind the disparate 
groups of a “Brussels Bubble” and others is a stronger sense of common European 
culture. Moreover, as described by Volina Serban, the EU has increased its efforts 
in the cultural domain in regards to European “shared” values and traditions to 
invigorate the “masses” and foster a collective memory and consciousness. Along 
these lines, Christoph Kuehn in “The European Identity – Idealism, Implementation 
and Information” describes that in order for a “European identity” to be expressed, 
citizens need to be able to interact between member states, and this requires a 
more effective set of EU platforms and infrastructure. This is a common theme 
expressed by OneEurope; that a precondition for European democratization is an 
effective European public sphere, requiring new tools (such as crowdfunding) and 
social media platforms.  
Moving to the offline realm, moreover, Ignasi Mesa suggests that the EU 
focuses on “glocalization” in order for more concerted effort toward 
acknowledging and utilizing local knowledge that connect to macro levels of 
policy-making in solving intractable problems. The European Citizens' Initiative 
(ECI) could be described as an effort in glocalization as it deals with various issues, 
such as the euro crisis, which obviously impact local communities, while 
cultivating “the development of the European public space”.34 This could be 
considered an example of bridging the gap between the ephemeral public sphere 
with, arguably, more pragmatic elements of civil society; in other words, how the 
European project can be “put into practice by the majority of the European 
citizens”, as Paul Hahnenkamp states.35  
Finally, OneEurope describe bottom-up processes as integral to developing 
European identity to support a democratic European project. Echoing discussions 
at the 2013 Conference of the European Year of Citizens, a new participatory 
strategy is considered vital for a European identity as well as rights to equal 
citizenship, more effective communication and increased mobility. This resonates 
with European Alternatives and the debating platform Political Critique, which 
both suggest the need for more bottom-up approaches in developing a sense of 
European belonging and more strongly linking this to support of European 
                                                 
33  The growth of European-wide inequality and destabilizing effects to nation states could be 
considered. Simona Pronckute sees social exclusion and inequality as a threat to equal EU 
citizenship. http://one-europe.info/the-eu-year-of-the-citizens-what-does-it-mean-for-the-citi 
zens (retrieved on 28th October 2016). 
34  http://one-europe.info/europe-s-first-citizens-initiative-to-start-collecting-signatures-in-augu 
st (retrieved on 28th October 2016). 
35  http://one-europe.info/a-european-civil-society-on-the-way (retrieved on 28th October 2016). 
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movements and representatives elected through an enhanced transnational 
system. 
As is evident, much of the conceptual characteristics regarding a European 
public sphere connect with various forms of defining a European identity and 
increasing a sense of “belongingness”, shared European culture and values. 
Political Critique’s interview by Slawek Blich with professor Panagiotis 
Sotiris of the University of Aegean in Greece, had many questions focused on how 
elements of “social forces” are unleashed as a result of political conflict, in this 
case the rise of Syriza and the issues they faced. Specifically, a common theme 
from this interview relates to the common interests of Europeans and their 
rejection of neoliberal EU policies and austerity.36 It could be intimated that these 
common interests across Europe could liberate social forces in a democratic 
struggle faced by all Europeans. Along these lines, an article by Dawid Krawczyk 
entitled “Rudan: Working people must achieve unity with the migrant workers” 
resonated with particular characteristics of the transnational civic/public sphere 
concept. From the angle of workers’ rights and labor union struggles across 
Europe, Krawczyk describes how a transnational social strike could be organized 
by “building bridges between workers” and collaborative efforts with grassroots 
labor unions.37  
Publixphere produced one article that met the criteria for the transnational 
civil/public sphere concept, entitled “Activate Europe. Online Only?”. Written by 
Publixphere’s editorial team, findings of workshop activities focused on how to 
more effectively use digital technology are described to connect Europeans at a 
transnational level. The report also explores methods beyond digital technology. 
Publixphere acknowledged that a “Europe of citizens” exists, to a certain extent. To 
develop a culture around this requires more digital forums that enable a sense of 
European belongingness; social media are, of course, suggested as useful in 
building personal relations and communities that can foster this. Although not 
tapping into a broader audience due to its strong pro-EU stance, OneEurope’s 
website is described as being an important platform for the development of 
European belongingness.  
Through these workshops, Publixphere also found that civil society initiatives 
should be more concerned with seeking financial sources through a more 
professional manner and recognize the recurring issue of temporary funding, as 
most funds typically come from foundations and are short-term. Language 
barriers were also recognized as an impediment to the development of the 
transnational civic/public sphere, but that English should be embraced as the 
default for discourse, while maintaining respect for other languages.  
Some of the contributions on the platforms resonate with the conceptual work 
discussed in section 2.4. An emphasis by Political Critique on the relation between 
identity building and social struggles can be regarded to concretize ideas 
                                                 
36  http://politicalcritique.org/world/eu/2015/sotiris-ready-for-a-rupture/ (retrieved on 28th Octo-
ber 2016). 
37  http://politicalcritique.org/world/eu/2015/rudan-working-class-unity-with-migrants/ (retrieved 
on 28th October 2016). 
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developed by European Alternatives regarding a public sphere from below. The 
confrontations with neoliberalism and austerity or TTIP likewise seem to add a 
concrete dimension to such ideas. OneEurope contributions also emphasize 
bottom-up approaches, though we referred to another OneEurope contribution 
stipulating a top-down dimension (European taxes precede identity) in section 2.2. 
However, there seems to be little concern for reforms regarding NGO participation 
or a more general top-down approach to the formation of a transnational civic and 
public sphere. The debating platforms regard themselves as a bottom-up 
contribution to the development of a European public sphere, which may preclude 
a critical reflection on the feasibility of this endeavor without having the 
necessary groundwork in place. As stated previously, Milanese of European 
Alternatives emphasizes that the Habermasian idea of a public sphere is 
problematic in that it replaces social struggle between antagonizing forces in 
society - which is foundational to emboldening a public sphere - with procedura-
lism. Also, again, as PDU state “... A public sphere comes into existence when there 
is an authority, which, through its decisions, affects my daily life and where I have 
the ability to influence such decisions” (interview three).  
Nonetheless, if such an attempt to develop an EU authority of this nature is 
truly undertaken, the proliferation of a European public sphere will inevitably 
require an environment of access to information. Ultimately, this depends on a 
strong yet neutral fourth estate. As PDU suggest, the media should focus on 
“deliberations in the European Institutions” (2013), and the European Parliament 
in particular. Also, more efforts where Europeans have physical spaces to engage 
each other are deemed necessary and the artistic and theatrical activities by 
European Alternatives do present potential opportunities for this engagement, 
beyond the heavily relied upon online dimensions of a European public sphere. It 
is clear, however, that this will not fundamentally change the limited and 
fragmented character of the European public sphere, as it coexists with 
technocratic and elite spheres. 
 
 
 
4 Overall conclusion 
Reading through the collective output of five pro-European think tanks provided 
us with some clarity about their contributions to the debate on the future of 
Europe. The strongest and clearest effort was detected in the area of an expanded 
notion of European citizenship. Pro-European think tanks want to overcome the 
legal and political restrictions attached to the national citizenship base of 
European citizenship. Resident and migrant rights are high on the agenda, and 
some efforts are made to strengthen European social citizenship. In this area it is 
most obvious that pro-European think tanks beg to differ from what we read in 
the documents on the future of Europe that emanate from circles closer to the 
official institutions. Interestingly, the contributions to online platforms are less 
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numerous, but can be regarded as adding to the work done by our slate of 
advocacy think tanks (e.g. bringing in concrete ideas about necessary reforms of 
the European charter of fundamental rights).  
The related conceptual innovation of a European public interest economy adds 
another dimension to the social citizenship agenda, in principle. But the 
conceptual ideas in this area remain exceedingly vague. It is clear that 
mainstream agendas of growth and competitiveness are fully rejected in favor of 
goals that relate to public interests, the fight against austerity and unemployment, 
the rejection of corporate economic power in general, and the power of the 
financial sector in particular. It is clear that democracy cannot be advanced under 
the prevailing conditions of neoliberal economic policy orientation. But what kind 
of alternative economy and economic policy are proposed remains unclear. In this 
area, the online platforms reflect the lack of perspective rather than adding to the 
drive. There appears to be a great distance between the pro-European think tanks 
and platforms to traditional actors like trade unions, at least in terms of what we 
can find as written output. In 3,000 plus documents examined, trade unions and 
progressive economic forces were hardly mentioned. The battles against the 
dominance of private capital, deregulation, privatization and financialization are 
hard to win if the Europeans in favor of a regulated market order, mixed 
economies and a clear priority of specific social objectives and public interests 
remain relatively unfocused and isolated. 
The conceptual innovations in the areas of transnational democracy and 
civic/public spheres are interlinked as are the areas of social citizenship and 
public interest economy. The pro-European think tanks are passionate in support 
of a true transnational democracy, which is a clear counter-narrative to the denial 
perspective of the old and new right-wing forces that claim that it is impossible to 
develop democracy beyond the nation state. Democratic rights of Europe’s 
citizenry are considered to be severely constrained by the weight of the corporate 
sector in preference formation and decision making, as well as the lack of 
dedicated efforts to constrain private economic forces and the power of 
economically strong member states in relation to the weaker parts of the EU. 
Since the role of democratic institutions of the EU, namely the European 
Parliament, has been weakened by the new economic governance, there is a clear 
notion of a backlash and an uphill battle for European democracy. Yet, there are 
surprisingly few notions as to how to react to these challenges. The Spinelli Report 
arguably provides more clarity with regard to the task of overcoming the 
constraints of the Parliament in the new economic governance regime than the 
voices from the pro-European think tanks. Surprisingly, little work is devoted to 
key actors in democracy, namely political parties and efforts to transcend a 
nation-state centered mode of democracy.  
Only in the sharp focus on the necessary conditions of transnational 
democracy, namely a more strongly developed European civic/public sphere, the 
pro-European think tanks have an edge, this time in strong contrast to the 
perspectives voiced in documents closer to the EU institutions (of the Commission, 
EP and experts close to certain council members), which are surprisingly quiet in 
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this regard despite the efforts undertaken to strengthen European participatory 
democracy (citizen initiatives etc.) and political parties (by way of financing weak 
European political party foundations). Pro-European think tanks argue in favor of 
strengthening the European public sphere from below (in struggles), from above 
(by way of demands on the European institutions) and integration of civil society 
organizations. Debating platforms in turn mostly feature contributions reflecting 
the bottom-up perspective, which can be regarded as the reason for their 
existence. But neither the pro-European think tanks nor the pro-European 
debating platforms seem to pursue a common agenda with regard to what should 
actually be achieved in this area. No common demands on common European 
media and other dimensions of a less fragmented and temporary European public 
sphere is visible so far. It is not clear if there is potential to develop a common 
European civic and public sphere, even if there will be instances of devolution and 
(partial) disintegration. Even if the UK is leaving the EU, there continues to be a 
strong need to overcome national barriers of communication of the people if 
corporations, trade regimes and monetary orders exert power across borders in a 
systematic and sustained way. It seems prudent to combine the conceptual 
discussions in this area: complementary notions of a transnational public sphere 
should be organized “from above” (PDU), “from below” (European Alternatives) and 
by way of better integration of NGOs (EuropaNova). These organizations share a 
common understanding that a European public sphere is complementary to 
European democratic development, and must not be limited largely to elites and 
experts. Much more effort in any case has to go into the building of lasting 
independent forces and permanent communication across borders if we are to 
observe a continuous and defragmented European public sphere. 
In general, it appears that both the conceptual efforts of the pro-European 
think tanks and the contributions to the pro-European debating platforms lack 
clarity with regard to the character of the main social struggles and challenges of 
the present time: Who are the forces that drive Europe apart and how can they be 
countered? What are the key projects in the areas of European citizenship, 
transnational democracy, public sphere and a different economy dedicated to 
advance public interests that citizens can rally around? There is no lack of 
goodwill in the quarter of pro-European think tanks, their constituents and 
contributors. But a lot of work remains to be done to sharpen the debate and 
provide more focus for the broader public. Most conceptual efforts for a different 
and closer European Union appear to come from the left; European Alternatives in 
the case of the sample we studied. Perhaps it is not unimportant that this group is 
less integrated with the mainstream institutions, but perhaps it is also not 
unimportant that the left-wing pro-European forces display a strong lack of 
integration with progressive forces in economy and society. Certain ambivalence 
in the fight for Europe and against neoliberalism and austerity can be easily 
detected; it is a necessary fight, but it cannot be fought without closer 
approximation of pro-European forces with regard to a common project.  
While the center-left pro-European forces might be united with regard to a 
common social model, the center-right pro-European forces are united with 
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regard to the foreign policy dimension; each European member state alone is 
weak in comparison and in relation to major world powers. While the documents 
we studied to obtain contrast from more official future perspectives of EU 
institutions were weak with regard to expanded European citizenship, 
transnational democracy and the European public sphere, let alone the concept of 
a European public interest economy, they are very vocal about the expanded 
foreign policy role of what remains of the EU. The relative weakness of each 
European nation state (including Germany!) is reason enough to temper 
inclinations to disintegrate. But foreign policy strength must be grounded in 
domestic realities, as we can now see very clearly in the British case. If Europe 
fails to turn left in an effort to increase social cohesion and solidarity across the 
border, it is likely that not much will be left of Europe in today’s hyper-
competitive global economy.   
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5 Annex 
5.1 Tables 
Table 24: Articles on expanded European citizenship (universal and inviolable 
    citizenship/resident rights) 
Think tank Publication Year 
EuropaNova A Europe that dares, in the interests of the Europeans. 
60 practical proposals to build a European Power  
2010 
EuropaNova L’Europe c’est nous! Synthèse des seconds etats 
généraux de l’Europe  
2008 
European 
Alternatives 
20. June - Join the World Refugee Day 2015 
European 
Alternatives 
Citizens’ Manifesto for European democracy, solidarity 
and equality 
2014 
European 
Alternatives 
Citizens’ consultation on LGBT rights in Europe: findings 
for the Citizens’ Manifesto 
2013 
European 
Alternatives 
Citizens’ consultation on work, welfare and precarity in 
Europe: findings for the Citizens Manifesto 
2013 
European 
Alternatives 
Common asylum policy in the EU 2011 
Source: Own compilation 
Table 25: Articles on transnational democracy/institutional primacy of Europe 
Think tank Publication Year 
DIKTIO - Network for 
Reform in Greece 
and Europe 
After the Greek deal: three dangers and three 
opportunities - why it is urgent to complete EMU 
2015 
DIKTIO - Network for 
Reform in Greece 
and Europe 
The evolution of the EMU and the balance with 
countries outside the Eurozone. 
2015 
European 
Alternatives 
A tennis court oath for Europe 2015 
European 
Alternatives 
Towards a transnational democracy for Europe 2013 
European 
Alternatives 
Euro crisis calls for a new politics fit for the age 2011 
European 
Alternatives 
Legality and struggle against organized crime: 2011 
Project for a 
Democratic Union 
It’s all or nothing: how to make the EU more 
democratic, transparent and efficient  
2015 
Project for a 
Democratic Union 
Centralization and democratization can go hand in 
hand! 
2013 
Project for a 
Democratic Union 
Democracy in Europe - its origins and its future 2013 
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Project for a 
Democratic Union 
Statement of principles UNK 
Project for a 
Democratic Union 
The 1st principle: a more democratic and more 
powerful Europe 
UNK 
Source: Own compilation 
Table 26: Articles on European public service economy/economic democracy 
Think tank Publication Year 
DIKTIO - Network for 
Reform in Greece 
and Europe 
After the Greek deal: three dangers and three 
opportunities - why it is urgent to complete EMU 
2015 
EuropaNova Un pacte européen pour le prochain président de la 
République 
2012 
EuropaNova Pour une gouvernance économique européenne au 
service de la croissance 
2011 
European 
Alternatives 
Citizens’ Manifesto for European democracy, solidarity 
and equality 
2014 
European 
Alternatives 
Euro crisis calls for a new politics fit for the age 2011 
European 
Alternatives 
Labor and social Europe 2011 
European 
Alternatives 
Legality and struggle against organised crime 2011 
European 
Alternatives 
Manifesto of the appalled economists 2010 
European 
Alternatives 
The state of the media in Italy: a European problem UNK 
EuropaNova Le nouvel impératif industriel 2012 
Project for a 
Democratic Union 
The 10th principle: the Union should be committed to 
sustainable growth - project for democratic union (PDU) 
2015 
Source: Own compilation 
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Table 27: Articles on transnational civic/public sphere 
Think tank Publication Year 
EuropaNova L’Europe c’est nous! Synthèse des seconds etats 
généraux de l’Europe  
2008 
EuropaNova Peut-on encore faire l’Europe sans les Européens? 
Recommandations de la société civile au Conseil 
européen 
2006 
European 
Alternatives 
When in Rome -- transnational dialogues 2014 2014 
European 
Alternatives 
Migrants rights: open access for civil society and 
journalists to detention centres for migrants 
2011 
European 
Alternatives 
The state of the media in Italy: a European problem UNK 
Project for a 
Democratic Union 
The need for a European public sphere  2013 
Project for a 
Democratic Union 
Statement of principles UNK 
Project for a 
Democratic Union 
The 13th principle: the importance of a European public 
sphere  
UNK 
Source: Own compilation 
Table 28: Articles on Europe as central power in global political economy 
Think tank Publication Year 
Project for a 
Democratic Union 
Statement of principles 2015 
Source: Own compilation 
Table 29: Articles on transnational democracy in Europe by debating platforms 
Think tank Publication Year  
Eutopia (ideas for 
Europe magazine) 
Machiavelli in China, or, European democracy and the 
return of conflict 
2016 
Eutopia (ideas for 
Europe magazine) 
The sunset of sovereign powers over the European 
Union 
2015 
Eutopia (ideas for 
Europe magazine) 
Active solidarity with Greece as a condition for 
democracy in Europe 
2015 
Eutopia (ideas for 
Europe magazine) 
A United States of Europe 2014 
Eutopia (ideas for 
Europe magazine) 
The cracks in Europe 2014 
Eutopia (ideas for 
Europe magazine) 
In elections we trust 2014 
Eutopia (ideas for 
Europe magazine) 
Social movements in neoliberal Europe 2014 
Eutopia (ideas for 
Europe magazine) 
The European Constituent Assembly. Episode 3 2014 
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Eutopia (ideas for 
Europe magazine) 
The European Constituent Assembly. Episode 2 2014 
Eutopia (ideas for 
Europe magazine) 
The European Constituent Assembly 2014 
FutureLab Europe FutureLab Europe’s Manifesto 2016 - Reviving 
democracy for a citizens-led Europe 
2016 
FutureLab Europe Manifesto: choose European democracy, abandon the 
politics of numbers! 
2015 
OneEurope The Nation State 2015 
OneEurope Connect with the Commission via the European 
Citizens’ Initiative 
2014 
OneEurope Shaping Europe from the bottom up 2014 
OneEurope A federal Europe - but what kind? 2013 
OneEurope Busting the democratic deficit 2013 
OneEurope Integration, austerity and democracy 2013 
OneEurope National politicians versus European ones 2013 
OneEurope The crisis of representative democracy in the EU - The 
European year of citizens  
2013 
OneEurope Bazaar ″L′Europe″!! 2012 
OneEurope European identity: taxation with representation 2012 
OneEurope Participatory democracy in the European Union: the 
European Citizens’ Initiative 
2012 
OneEurope Report on the future of Europe: federalism and 
democracy 
2012 
OneEurope European complexity affects democracy  2012 
Political Critique Equality, freedom, and fraternity for all 2015 
Political Critique What after Brexit? Let us learn from the populists while 
fighting them 
2016 
Political Critique Marsili: remain to change is DiEM’s message [interview] 2016 
Political Critique Time to dream big dreams about the Central-European 
Federation 
2016 
Political Critique Horvat: there is no messiah 2016 
Political Critique Announcing DiEM 25 – the Democracy in Europe 
Movement 2025 
2016 
Political Critique TalkReal webshow: Varoufakis, Matias, Sierakowski, 
Orazzini, Marsili 
2016 
Political Critique A manifesto for democratising Europe 2016 
Political Critique Stokfiszewski: the demand for democratization is a 
reaction to the EU’s original sin [interview] 
2016 
Political Critique Can you eat dDemocracy? 2016 
Political Critique Brexit threatens Europe’s mission 2016 
Political Critique Feinberg: an austere place of refuge 2016 
Political Critique A message from Prague [Open letter to Yanis 
Varoufakis] 
2016 
Publixphere Der Brexit als Chance für Europa? 2016 
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Publixphere Europa: Eine neue Version ist verfügbar 2016 
Publixphere #eu2020: Workshop "Europäische Republik" 2015 
Publixphere Europe: a new version is available 2015 
Publixphere Bullmann (SPD): Troika - Bürokratenherrschaft ohne 
Verantwortung  
2014 
Source: Own compilation 
Table 30: Articles on varied perspectives on transnational civic/public sphere 
Think tank Publication Year 
Eutopia (ideas for 
Europe magazine) 
Can the bottom-up actions of citizens regenerate 
democracy in Europe? 
2014 
FutureLab Europe FutureLab Europe's fifth generation will investigate 
active citizenship for their spring publication 
2015 
FutureLab Europe Self-organized European Citizens’ Initiative against TTIP. 
Has the EU heard its citizens’ voices? 
2015 
FutureLab Europe Bringing Europe to schools? Still a worthy cause! 2014 
FutureLab Europe Europe@debate: new social and digital Media in the 
European Public sphere 
2014 
OneEurope To polder or not to polder? That’s the question 2015 
OneEurope Building European civil society - New tools and social 
media platforms 
2014 
OneEurope Inventing Traditions for Europe – Part Two 2014 
OneEurope Shaping Europe from the bottom up 2014 
OneEurope The European identity – idealism, implementation and 
information 
2014 
OneEurope The crisis of representative democracy in the EU - The 
European year of citizens 
2013 
OneEurope Europe and the old nationalisms - Part 3 2013 
OneEurope The EU year of the citizens: what does it mean for the 
citizens? 
2013 
OneEurope Europe’s first citizens′ initiative to start collecting 
signatures in August 
2012 
OneEurope Keeping the Brussels bubble closed 2012 
OneEurope Participatory democracy in the European Union: the 
European Citizens’ Initiative 
2012 
Publixphere Activate Europe - Online only? 2015 
Source: Own compilation 
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5.2 Description of debating platforms 
European Democracy Lab 
The European Democracy Lab was founded by Ulrike Guérot in 2014, together with 
Victoria Kupsch, in order to shift the debate from a “more/less-European 
integration” paradigm in European debates to consideration a different Europe. 
The core project of the EDL in the beginning was entitled “National Parliaments 
and European Democracy”, looking at the so-called democratic deficit and the 
flawed input legitimacy of the EU. EDL challenged national deputies on European 
democracy and asked how they see their influence on European decision making 
as well as their relationship towards the EP. The goal was to make a comparative 
study on whether national deputies of different EU countries think similarly – or 
differently – about how European democracy should look and function (project 
achievement and final report are targeted for the end of 2016). In addition, the 
EDL, through an interactive, multilingual website (http://www.european-
republic.eu/) as well as intensive media work and a variety of publications, tried 
to sketch out a completely new political and institutional narrative and design for 
Europe under the notion of “Europe as Republic”. This has struck a chord and has 
become a sounding board in recent months, arguably shaping the European debate 
in Germany to some extent. Initial funding of $200,000 for two years (2014-2016) 
had been provided through grant by the Open Society Foundation. 
European Way 
European Way is the youngest of all European networks or think tanks that were 
observed in this study. Founded in 2016 – in the midst of the research – European 
way is considered too new to have been fully integrated into this analyses and 
has, other than on its website, not yet published studies, papers or other written 
material. It operates primarily as a network and has obtained funding of €10,000 
by the German Hans Böckler Foundation to pursue further institutionalization. Its 
young members and activists come mainly from a trade unionist background, or 
have a stipend from either the Böckler or Ebert foundation. Their thinking is 
channeled into a politicized European project, with a strong focus and emphasis on 
the role of trade unions, wages, and workers’ rights (“Mitbestimmung”) in a 
transnational European economy, within Eurozone governance. European Way has 
been inspired by the European Democracy Lab and the idea of Europe as a 
republic, with a mission statement that focuses on the realization of Europe as a 
Republic. This shows the conceptual linkages between this new generation of 
European think tanks, which in itself is interesting in terms of cluster theories, 
system theories of “creative innovation” and network analysis.  
Eurobubble Berlin 
Eurobubble Berlin is a new Facebook Group with a collection of people who “feel 
European” in Berlin. Eurobubble is not institutionalized, has no funding, and does 
not pursue activities (workshops, seminars or publications) nor does it have 
strategic goals. But it is another indication that suggests that young people are 
uniting, forming or gathering in whatever way through a European format.  
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OneEurope 
The following distribution of activities characterizes the work of this think tank. 
 
Thematic field Number of Publications 
Governance/Institutions/Composition 313 
Culture/Society 234 
Economics 106 
Social/Education/Health 85 
Countries/EU International 73 
General 43 
Defence/Security 29 
Ecology/Environmentalism 9 
Source: Own compilation 
 
OneEurope thus has been most active on topics related to European institutions, 
democracy and governance followed by cultural issues, economics, social and 
foreign policy issues. 
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